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INTERNATIONAL TRAVELERS AND SHIPPERS
BEWARE: IS ANYONE LIABLE WHEN
CUSTOMS AGENTS DAMAGE PROPERTY?
Scorr A. WOLD
I. INTRODUCTION
ON JANUARY 22, 1989, Gene Locks arrived in Phila-
delphia from London.' To his dismay, a sculpture he
had purchased in England did not arrive with him in Phil-
adelphia as planned. Airline officials informed Locks that
his sculpture would likely arrive the next day and that they
would call him when it did so that he could clear it
through customs. The sculpture, which was packaged in a
crate, arrived the next day. Without calling Locks, an air-
line employee presented it to a customs official for clear-
ance through customs.
After the airline employee opened the crate, a customs
official briefly examined the art piece. The sculpture con-
sisted of three pails welded together with sealed tops. Af-
ter noting that the pails seemed unusually heavy, the
agent gave the sculpture to two other customs agents for
further inspection in an adjacent room. Although such an
examination usually consists of taking an x-ray of the
item, the machine in the room was too small to x-ray the
sculpture. The only machine large enough was located at
the end of the terminal. Therefore, to determine the con-
tents of the pails, the agents drilled small holes in the top
and bottom of them. Still unable to ascertain the con-
, See Locks v. Three Unidentified Customs Serv. Agents, 759 F. Supp. 1131
(E.D. Pa. 1990); Locks v. British Airways, 759 F. Supp. 1137 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
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tents, the agents completely removed a portion of one
pail. Upon doing this, the agents concluded that sand and
pebbles caused the unusual weight and cleared the sculp-
ture through customs. Although the sculpture was valued
at almost $21,000, Locks could only recover $90.70 in
subsequent lawsuits for its destruction. 2
The damage done to Gene Locks' property is likely one
of many such occurrences. This Comment discusses the
liability of the various actors in situations where customs
agents damage airline passengers' and shippers' property
during customs inspections. Passengers and shippers,
like Locks, generally recover very little. Part II of this
Comment discusses the United States government's virtu-
ally non-existent liability in such situations. Part III con-
siders the limited liability of individual customs agents.
Part IV identifies the possibility of recovery against air-
lines. Finally, Part V recommends several changes that, if
made, would insure that the results in such situations
meet our tort system's goals of compensation and
deterrence.
II. LIABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT
The most desirable defendant in a case where custom
agents damage a passenger's or shipper's property is the
United States government, since the funds from which to
recover are so great.' Under the Federal Torts Claim Act
(FTCA), the federal government has waived much of its
sovereign immunity in citizens' tort actions.4 To instigate
2 British Airways, 759 F. Supp. at 1141.
Suits against the Customs Service are treated as suits against the United
States. Shelton v. United States Customs Serv., 565 F.2d 1140, 1141 (9th Cir.
1977) (per curiam) (holding that government agencies are not subject to suit un-
less Congress has authorized such a suit, and Congress has not granted authoriza-
tion for suits against the Customs Service).
4 See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1988) ("The United States shall be liable, respecting the
provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same
extent as a private individual under like circumstances .... "). Historically, a per-
son could not recover from the government for injury or loss caused by govern-
ment employees. Ronald L. Cornell, Jr., Note, Property Damage Claims Against the
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an action against the government the citizen must file an
administrative claim with the Customs Administration.5
Although administrative claims may provide the plaintiff
with an excellent avenue for relief,6 such a discussion is
beyond the scope of this Comment, which focuses instead
on judicial remedies.
Despite the waiver of sovereign immunity under the
FTCA, a judicial claim against the government for prop-
erty damage caused by customs agents will fail in almost
all cases due to an exception to the waiver of immunity
under the FTCA.7 In Kosak v. United States8 the Supreme
Court broadly construed the language of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(c) to exclude claims both for damage to property
resulting from detention of the property and for damage
to property resulting from negligent handling or storage
during detention. Prior to the Kosak decision, the mean-
ing of the section 2680(c) exception was unclear. Some
circuit courts thought section 2680(c) applied only to
damage resulting from the actual detention itself, while
others applied it to claims for damage occurring during
detention.9
Customs Service: Are There Adequate Remedies?, 22 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 385, 388-89
(1989) (citing Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 2 &
n.2 (1924)).
5 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1988) ("An action shall not be instituted upon a claim
against the United States ... unless the claimant should have first presented the
claim to the appropriate Federal agency ...."). The claimant must present the
claim in writing within two years after the claim accrues. Id. § 2401(b).
6 See Philip E. Weiss, Comment, Claims Against Customs for Cargo Damage: The
Administrative Route - the Path of Least Resistance, 1 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 119 (1989).
Weiss comments that the administrative claim may be the "path of least resist-
ance" because the cost of such a claim is low and settlement occurs fairly quickly.
Id. at 141. Such settlement, however, is at the discretion of the agency. See 28
U.S.C. § 2672 (Supp. 1 1990) (authorizing the head of the appropriate agency to
compensate persons for injury to property caused by the negligence or wrongful
act of an employee).
7 See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (1988) (stating there will be no cause of action for
"[a]ny claim arising in respect of... the detention of any goods or merchandise by
any officer of customs") (emphasis added); Cornell, supra note 4; Case Comment,
Governmental Liability for Customs Officials' Negligence: Kosak v. United States, 67
MINN. L. REV. 1040 (1983).
, 465 U.S. 848, 854 (1984).
9 See Cornell, supra note 4, at 394-95; Case Comment, supra note 7, at 1045-50.
495
496 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [59
In Kosak the Supreme Court reasoned that a literal
reading of the statute, the legislative history, and the
objectives of the exceptions all supported the broad find-
ing that the exception includes any claim arising out of a
customs detention.' The Court looked first at the lan-
guage of the statute and considered the ordinary meaning
of the words." The Court reasoned that the "fairest in-
terpretation of the crucial portion of the provision is the
one that first springs to mind."' 2 The words "arising in
respect of"' 3 mean "arising out of," the Court opined,
and,. therefore, those words encompass claims based on
negligent property handling.' 4
The Court then looked to the legislative history to sup-
port its conclusion. It first considered a statement by the
drafter of the pertinent portion of the statute and found
that the drafter believed that the exception would bar suit
for negligent handling of detained property.' 5 The Court
also cited a Congressional committee report which sug-
gested that section 2680(c) covers claims "arising out of"
detention. 16
Finally, the Court argued that its liberal reading of sub-
section (c) best complied with the intent of Congress for
the exceptions to the FTCA found in section 2680.1' The
Court's reading fits best with the first purpose of the ex-
ception, protecting certain government activities from
disruptive suits.' 8 The Court reasoned that subsection (c)
allows customs agents to use the powerful tool of search
and detainment in seeking compliance with the customs
Claims arising from the detention would include injuries such as loss of use or
depreciation from a wrongful detention.
o Kosak, 465 U.S. at 854-59.
Id. at 853.
12 Id. at 854.
11 See supra note 7 for the relevant text of the statute.
'4 Kosak, 465 U.S. at 854.
15 id. at 856-57 (citing ALEXANDER HOLTZOFF, REPORT ON PROPOSED FEDERAL
TORTS CLAIMs BILL 16 (1931)).
Ili Id. at 857 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1945)).
17 Id. at 858-59.
I Id. at 859.
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laws free from fear of suit.' 9 The Court also found that its
reading better protected the government from fraudulent
claims, fulfilling another purpose of the exceptions. 20 It
reasoned that because the Customs Service lacks the re-
sources necessary to carefully document the condition of
detained property, it is difficult to identify fraudulent suits
for damage to detained property. 2' Finally, the Court ar-
gued that its reading of subsection (c) best complied with
Congress's third goal - to avoid government liability for
claims for which adequate alternative remedies already
exist.22 The Court found this purpose to be satisfied be-
cause the property owner may have a tort claim against
individual customs agents or an implied bailment claim
against the government under the Tucker Act.2' As this
Comment later discusses, the Supreme Court's reasoning
is open to some criticism, indicating that the Court could
have decided the case differently. 24 Based on current case
law, however, it appears that an FTCA claim against the
United States will fail.
Despite the lack of an FTCA claim, the Court in Kosak
did acknowledge a property owner's right to sue the gov-
ernment under the Tucker Act when customs agents dam-
age her property. 25 Under the Tucker Act, plaintiffs may
sue the government in actions not sounding in tort, as
long as the claim does not exceed $10,000.26 Generally,
such claims will take one of two forms: a cause of action




22 Id. at 858.
213 Id. at 860 & n.22. At this time, the government usually paid any recovery an
individual received via a tort claim against a Customs agent. Id. at 860.
24 See infra notes 257-94 and accompanying text; see also KosaA, 465 U.S. at 862-
66 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (arguing that none of the majority's rationale was accu-
rate); Weiss, supra note 6, at 143-44 (arguing that the Court's reasoning was
incorrect).
2-5 Kosak, 465 U.S. at 860 n.22.
26 See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1988) (giving the district courts concurrent juris-
diction with the Claims Courts for claims "founded either upon the Constitution
... or upon any express or implied contract with the United States").
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of action for implied bailment.27 Both of these claims
have severe restrictions, however, and provide relief only
in limited situations.
Fifth Amendment uncompensated taking claims, for ex-
ample, have been uniformly rejected in cases involving
customs seizures.2 Such claims fail because seizures and
forfeitures pursuant to government regulatory functions,
such as customs enforcement, need not be compen-
sated. 9 Thus, in one case where Drug Enforcement
Agents seized the plaintiff's money allegedly without
probable cause, no taking requiring compensation tran-
spired because drug enforcement is a regulatory pro-
cess.30 One commentator has argued, however, that the
more plaintiff-oriented approach used by the Supreme
Court in some recent takings cases may change this out-
come.3 ' This, however, remains to be seen.
In the recent case ofAlde v. United States 32 the court used
the same rationale to deny recovery for a takings claim
where the plaintiff's plane was damaged during detain-
ment by the Customs Service. The court identified two
primary reasons for the claim's failure. First, the court
stated that a taking occurs "when the rightful property,
contract, or regulatory powers of the Government are em-
ployed to control rights or property which have not been
purchased. '33 Thus, if the plaintiff alleges that customs
acted wrongly or unlawfully, then there can be no tak-
ing.3 4 The second barrier to these takings claims was al-
ready discussed: Government action pursuant to its
27 Cornell, supra note 4, at 400-14.
2, Aide v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 26, 34 (1993).
2 Cornell, supra note 4, at 400-01 (citing LaChance v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct.
127 (1988)).
50 LaChance, 15 Cl. Ct. at 130.
31 Cornell, supra note 4, at 404.
2 28 Fed. Cl. 26 (1993).
3- Id. at 33 (emphasis added) (citing Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 791
F.2d 893, 898-99 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987)).
34 Id.
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police powers is traditionally noncompensable action. 5
The bailment claim is limited as well. A bailment arises
where a property owner delivers his property to another,
while retaining title, for some particular purpose upon an
express or implied contract.3 6 Whether the contract is al-
leged to be express or implied, the plaintiff must prove an
offer, acceptance, and consideration. 7 Furthermore, the
plaintiff must show that the contract included a promise
from an authorized customs agent that customs would
carefully handle the property.38 Usually the plaintiff will
not be able to provide such proof, and her claim will fail.3 9
Several cases illustrate this point.
In Insurance Co. of North America v. United States40 the
plaintiff importer delivered two containers of furniture to
the Customs Service for inspection. After customs com-
pleted a partial inspection, the plaintiff requested a more
extensive search because he feared that the lack of a com-
plete inspection would leave open the suspicion he was
smuggling drugs. During the more thorough search, cus-
toms agents destroyed the furniture. The court found no
implied-in-fact bailment, stating that there was no "prom-
ise, representation or statement by any authorized gov-
ernment official that plaintiff's goods would be returned
damage-free. '" 4'
The Insurance Company court distinguished this case
31 Id. at 34 (citing Jarboe-Lackey Feedlots, Inc. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 329,
338-39 (1985)).
36 Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 1, 3 (1986) (citing
Lienberger v. United States, 178 Ct. CI. 151, 167, 371 F.2d 831, 840, cert. denied,
389 U.S. 844 (1967)). Because the plaintiff must deliver the property, bailment
contracts arise only in detainment cases. Furthermore, the Tucker Act only ap-
plies to contracts implied in fact. Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct.
743, 747 (1985). Implied in fact contracts are inferred from the conduct of the
parties. Insurance Co., 11 Cl. Ct. at 3 (citing Prudential Ins. Co. v. United States,
801 F.2d 1295, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1086 (1987)).
37 Insurance Co., 11 Cl. Ct. at 3 (citing Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. United States,
261 U.S. 592 (1923)).
38 Cornell, supra note 4, at 407-14.
- Id.
40 11 Cl. Ct. 1 (1986).
41 Id. at 4.
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from Alliance Assurance Co. v. United States,42 in which the
Claims Court found an implied-in-fact bailment between
an importer and the Customs Service.43 The distinguish-
ing fact was that in Alliance the customs agent had given
the plaintiff several receipts, "at least two of which were
designed to restore the goods to the owner.' ' 44 The pres-
ence of receipts, however, may not always create the bail-
ment. In Llamera v. United States,45 for example, the Claims
Court found no implied-in-fact bailment despite the fact
that the plaintiff had received a receipt.46 The court
opined that when government officials seize property pur-
suant to police power authority, there is no reasonable
reason for the government to enter into the type of con-
tract required for the finding of an implied-in-fact bail-
ment.47 The court reiterated the reasoning in Alde v.
United States, stating that "[w]hen property is seized pursu-
ant to the Government's police powers, it is particularly
difficult to assume formation of a bailment contract. ' 48 In
that situation, the government has no reason to make an
offer of safekeeping and return.
Thus, the government's liability for common law torts
in customs property damage cases appears limited. There
are, however, three possible exceptions to this general
rule based on FTCA claims. First, one commentator has
argued that where a person gives a customs agent a piece
of property for inspection rather than detention, and the
agent damages it, the government will be liable because
no detention is involved. 49 The validity of this presumption
has not yet been tested by the Supreme Court. In Kosak
the plaintiff's claim that the government was liable for
damage to a pagoda, which was destroyed during the pre-
42 252 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1958).
4. Insurance Co., II CI. Ct. at 5.
44 Id.
45 15 CI. Ct. 593 (1988).
46 Id. at 597. The court reasoned that the receipt was not evidence of an agree-
ment that the Coast Guard would take care of the property (a boat). Id.
47 Id.
4, 28 Fed. Cl. 26, 31 (1993).
41, Case Comment, supra note 7, at 1056.
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detention search, went unanswered because that issue was
not presented on appeal. 50  Furthermore, the Court re-
fused to define "detention, ' 5' which would have at least
partially resolved this issue.
Since the Kosak decision, only one court has specifically
decided whether section 2680 covers damage incurred
during inspection. In Goodman v. United States 5 2 the Eighth
Circuit held that the word detention in section 2680(c)
encompasses routine customs inspections as well as actual
detentions.53 The court reasoned that the concerns of the
Court in Kosak with regard to fraudulent claims were
equally valid whether there was a detention or just an in-
spection.54 In Locks v. Three Unidentified Customs Service
Agents a United States district court did not specifically ad-
dress the issue in the opinion, apparently deciding the is-
sue by dismissing the plaintiff's claim.55 The court held
that section 2680(c) of the FTCA barred a claim where a
customs agent damaged art work during an inspection in
a room adjacent to the inspection area.56
5 Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 850 n.3 (1984).
51 Id. at 853 n.8.
52 987 F.2d 550 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). The inspection in this case appar-
ently took place on a pier as the damage occurred when pier laborers under cus-
toms officials' supervision unloaded, inspected, and reloaded a freight container.
51 Id. at 551.
Id. at 552. One judge strongly dissented, saying:
The Customs Service is empowered to perform a number of func-
tions, including inspections, utilization of search warrants, or the
seizure and holding of property leading to forfeiture. Against this
broad background of the operation of the Custom[s] Service, Con-
gress chose to use only the word "detention". Had Congress de-
sired to use a broader term, it knew how to do so. Detention has a
more limited meaning in the context of the customs laws, and I be-
lieve it was error to hold that inspection equates with detention.
Id. (Gibson, J., dissenting).
55 Locks v. Three Unidentified Customs Serv. Agents, 759 F. Supp. 1131, 1136
(E.D. Pa. 1990).
56 Id. at 1133. The court's opinion did not specifically indicate that the inspec-
tion was equivalent to a section 2680(c) detention. Because the agents took the
property to a different room and conducted the inspection, however, it may be
possible to distinguish this case from one including a brief inspection at the nor-
mal customs checkpoint. Removing the property to a separate room arguably fits
better with a common sense notion of detention than does a brief inspection at a
checkpoint. It seems unreasonable to equate a temporary search with a detention
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Furthermore, two additional cases indicate that courts
will likely read the exception expansively. In one case,
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents damaged a car
so extensively while disassembling it in a drug search that
they effectively destroyed the car.5 7 The plaintiff argued
that section 2680(c) should not apply because the agents'
conduct exceeded a normal detention and constituted a
destruction. The plaintiff also argued that the agents ac-
ted unreasonably and were motivated by malice. The
court held that the distinction between a normal deten-
tion and a destruction was unimportant and that the ex-
ception contains no reasonableness limitation.58
In another case, the Customs Service sold the plaintiff's
goods after the plaintiff failed to claim them.59 Customs,
however, failed to notify the plaintiff as required by the
regulation governing sales.6 0 The plaintiff argued that
section 2680(c) should not apply since the damage oc-
curred from the sale, not from a detention. The court dis-
agreed, holding that section 2680(c) does not recognize a
distinction between a sale of goods and a detention of
goods.6' Therefore, on the basis of the previously cited
cases, it appears that the exception will cover damage dur-
ing an inspection as well as during a detention.
Another exception to the general rule of government
immunity from common law torts of customs agents may
exist where the plaintiff seeks recovery based on an inten-
tional tort not excepted in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)6 2 rather
that entails the holding of property for a certain amount of time. The purposes of
the exception as argued by the Kosak Court, however, are presumptively satisfied
in both cases.
51 Formula One Motors, Ltd. v. United States, 777 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1985).
5S Id. at 824.
59 Solus Ocean Sys., Inc. v. United States Customs Serv., 777 F.2d 326 (5th Cir.
1985). The goods were sold pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 127 (1993) (concerning gov-
ernment's right of disposal of unclaimed or abandoned merchandise).
- See 19 C.F.R. § 127.24 (1993) (requiring a 30-day notice prior to an impend-
ing government disposition).
61 Solus Ocean Sys., 777 F.2d at 328 (citing Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848
(1984)).
62 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1988).
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than on the agent's negligence.63 In Vu v. Meese the court
held that a claim against the United States for intentional
infliction of emotional distress arising from a customs
agent's detention of property was not barred by section
2680(c).64 In reaching its decision, the court discussed
the interplay between sections 2680(h) and 2680(c). It
reasoned that although subsection (c) begins with the
words "any claim," the fact that all subsections in section
2680 start this way would make subsection (h) unneces-
sary if Congress had intended the meaning of these words
to include intentional torts.65 As a result of its statutory
interpretation, the court held that section 2680(c) applies
only to negligent actions.66 Therefore, an intentional tort
claim made by the property owner based on a customs
agent's actions during an inspection, which are not cov-
ered by section 2680(h), may not be barred,67 and the
court may hold the government liable for the intentional
tort.68 Still, this does not compensate the plaintiff for the
63 See Vu v. Meese, 755 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. La. 1991).
- Id. at 1385.
65 Id. at 1385-86; see supra note 7 and infra note 68 for the relevant text of the
statute.
66 Id. at 1386.
67 The conduct, however, must still be considered within the employee's scope
of employment. For example, in one case the court dismissed a FTCA claim by an
importer who alleged that customs agents stole goods during an inspection. In-
ternational Fragrances, Inc. v. M.V. "San Martin I", No. Civ.A.90-6972 (LJF),
1992 WL 93220 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 1992). The court held that under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b), the actions a plaintiff bases her FTCA action on must be within the
employee's scope of employment as determined by state law. International Fra-
grances, Inc., 1992 WL at * 1. In this case, state law dictated that stealing would not
fall within the scope of employment, and therefore the plaintiff could not bring an
FTCA action. Id. This outcome prevented the court from deciding another im-
portant issue - whether section 2680(c) might not apply where the agents com-
mitted the intentional tort of theft.
6 Vu, 755 F. Supp. at 1386. It is unclear whether the exceptions in section
2680(h) even apply to actions against Customs agents. The statute states:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title
shall not apply to -
(h) Any claim arising out of assault ... or interference with con-
tract rights: Provided, That, with regard to acts or omissions of inves-
tigative or law enforcement officers of the United States
Government, the provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of
504 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [59
property damage and will not make the plaintiff whole.
Finally, a plaintiff may argue that the language of the
exception, specifically the words "goods or merchan-
dise,"' 69 has a particular meaning that does not include or-
dinary personal property. This third possible exception
to the general rule that the government is not liable for
the torts of customs agents stems from the dissent in Che-
ney v. United States.70 In that case, the plaintiff sued a law
enforcement officer under the FTCA. After having seized
title to the plaintiff's car from his safety deposit box, the
officer turned the title over to a third party who wrecked
the car. The court held that section 2680(c) barred the
action despite the plaintiff's claim that the officer never
detained the car. 7' Although this is the expected out-
come, the lone dissenting judge in the case argued that
section 2680(c) should not apply because the car was not
"goods or merchandise" within the meaning of the stat-
ute. 72 Although the judge did not expand upon this argu-
ment, one could argue that the words "goods or
merchandise" refer only to property being imported by
merchants for resale in the United States. Such a classifi-
cation might provide a way for a plaintiff to get around
section 2680(c) when her personal property is damaged
by negligent customs agents.
this title shall apply to any claim arising ... out of assault, battery,
false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious
prosecution.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). This subsection defines law enforcement officers as those
officers who are "empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to
make arrests for violations of Federal law." Id. Although the Vu court made no
mention of this part of the statute, it appears to apply to customs agents.
69 See supra note 7 for the relevant text of the statute.
70 972 F.2d 247 (8th Cir. 1992) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (per curiam).
71 Id. at 248 (citing Schlaebitz v. United States Dep't of Justice, 924 F.2d 193,
194 (11 th Cir. 1991)(per curiam)).
72 Id. at 249.
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III. LIABILITY OF INDIVIDUAL CUSTOMS
AGENTS
A. COMMON LAW TORT CLAIM
Traditionally, courts have held individual customs
agents personally liable for common law tort claims.73
Because the Director of Customs typically was not held
liable for the actions of lower level employees, the plain-
tiff in these suits faced the obstacle of proving which par-
ticular agent caused the damage. 4 Such proof would be
difficult if the plaintiff was absent during the inspection.
The plaintiff could sue the superior, however, if the supe-
rior directed the action of the subordinate. 75
Even when the plaintiff could prove which agent caused
the damage, official immunity limited the agent's personal
liability in some cases. Until recently, however, the
agent's immunity probably would not have blocked recov-
ery if customs agents damaged the property during an in-
spection. In 1988 the Supreme Court held in Westfall v.
Erwin 76 that government officials are absolutely immune
only when they act within the scope of their employment
and are performing discretionary functions." Under this
definition of official immunity, customs agents would not
be immune when they negligently damage property dur-
71 See Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944) (holding that
agents may be liable for "default or for negligence in the performance of [their]
duties"); Conklin v. Newton, 34 F.2d 612, 614 (2d Cir. 1929) (holding agents
liable for "unwarranted acts").
74 Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U.S. 507, 515 (1888).
75 Conklin, 34 F.2d at 612-13 (holding the Collector of Customs liable for the
negligence of his subordinates since the subordinates acted according to Collec-
tor's direct orders). In Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848 (1984), the Court
discussed this issue without deciding it. Although the government argued that the
plaintiff did not have to prove which particular agent caused the damage, the
Court opined that the plaintiff probably would have to identify the particular
agent unless the Director "expressly authorize[d] tortious conduct by a
subordinate." Id. at 861 n.23.
76 484 U.S. 292 (1988).
77 Id. at 297-98 (reasoning that this standard furthers the purpose of official
immunity - to protect the decision making process).
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ing routine customs inspections.78
While official immunity most likely did not apply to cus-
toms agents' negligence in inspecting peoples' property
after the Westfall decision, today it almost certainly does.
In response to Westfall, Congress passed the Federal Em-
ployee's Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act (Li-
ability Reform Act).79 In so doing, Congress intended to
reinstate absolute immunity for federal officials acting
within the "scope of [their] employment," regardless of
whether the act was discretionary. s0
The Liability Reform Act provides that an FTCA action
against the United States is the exclusive remedy for loss
of property arising or resulting from negligent or wrong-
ful acts of any government employee acting within the
scope of her employment.8 The Liability Reform Act is
particularly damaging to the plaintiff's claims in the situa-
tion at issue here. In United States v. Smith 8 2 the Supreme
Court held that the exclusive remedy clause barred a
claim against a federal employee acting within the scope
of his employment even if an exception to the FTCA also
barred the FTCA action.83 Thus, section 2680(c) of the
FTCA now bars tort claims against both the United States
7s A routine inspection would likely not include the level of discretion or policy
considerations necessary to be immune.
"1 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (Supp. 1 1989). For a treatment of the development of
official immunity prior to Westfall and the background of this Congressional re-
sponse to it, see William T. Cornell, Note, An Evaluation of the Federal Employees
Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act: Congress' Response to Westfall v. Erwin, 26
SAN DIEGo L. REV. 137 (1989).
80 See United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 165-67 (1991).
81 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1). The statute states:
The remedy against the United States provided by sections 1346(b)
and 2672 of this title for injury or loss of property, or personal injury
or death arising or resulting from the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment is exclusive of any other civil action
or proceeding ... against the employee ....
Id. (emphasis added). This does not apply if the official's action violates the Con-
stitution or a federal statute. Id. § 2679(b)(2)(A)(B).
812 499 U.S. 161 (1991).
83 Id. at 165 (holding an action for damages caused by a U.S. military physician
overseas barred by section 2680(k) of the FTCA).
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and individual customs agents for property damage the
agents cause during inspection or detention if the agents
were acting within the scope of their employment.
Therefore, the primary issue in a tort suit against a cus-
toms agent today is whether the official doing the inspec-
tion acted within the scope of her employment at the time
of the damage. Initially, the United States Attorney Gen-
eral decides this question by certifying that the action was
within the scope of employment, or by refusing to do so. 84
If the Attorney General makes the certification, most cir-
cuit courts have permitted the plaintiff to contest the deci-
sion before the district court.8 5
When the issue is before the court, certification raises a
presumption that the official acted within the scope of her
employment.86 The plaintiff must rebut this presumption
by producing specific facts to the contrary.87 Most courts
have applied state respondeat superior law to determine
whether the plaintiff has rebutted the presumption. 8
28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1). The statute states in part:
Upon certification by the Attorney General that the defendant em-
ployee was acting within the scope of his office or employment at the
time of the incident ... any civil action or proceeding commenced
upon such claim ... shall be deemed an action against the United
States . . . and the United States shall be substituted as the party
defendant.
Id. Apparently, the Attorney General's determination is based solely on her dis-
cretion. Id. § 2679(d)(3).
'5 See McHugh v. University of Vt., 966 F.2d 67, 71-72 (2d Cir. 1992); Brown v.
Armstrong, 949 F.2d 1007, 1011 (8th Cir. 1991); Meridian Int'l Logistics, Inc. v.
United States, 939 F.2d 740, 745 (9th Cir. 1991); Hamrick v. Franklin, 931 F.2d
1209, 1210 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 200 (1991); S. J. & W. Ranch, Inc. v.
Lehtinen, 913 F.2d 1538, 1540-41 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 62
(1991); Melo v. Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 642 (3d Cir. 1990), aff'd on other grounds, 112
S. Ct. 358 (1991); Nasuti v. Scannell, 906 F.2d 802, 812 (1st Cir. 1990); Arbour v.
Jenkins, 903 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1990). But see Johnson v. Carter, 983 F.2d
1316, 1319-20 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that the plain language of the statute gives
no discretion to the district court, and therefore, the Attorney General's decision
is conclusive); Mitchell v. Carlson, 896 F.2d 128, 131 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that
the Attorney General's certification is given preclusive effect); Aviles v. Lutz, 887
F.2d 1046, 1049 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that the "mandatory" language of the
statute does not permit the court to challenge the Attorney General's decision).
86 Brown, 949 F.2d at 1012.
87 Id.
18 See Pelletier v. Federal Home Loan Bank, 968 F.2d 865, 876 (9th Cir. 1992);
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Under the law of most states, it appears that negligent ac-
tions causing damage to a person's property will fall
within the customs agent's scope of employment. Actions
constituting more than mere negligence, however, may
not be within the scope of employment.
In Texas, for example, the court considers three factors
in determining if an employee acts within the scope of her
employment. These include whether the employee acted
within the general authority of the employer, in further-
ance of the employer's business, and to accomplish the
employer's objective. 9 Negligent acts would likely occur
while the agent was furthering the United States business
and meeting its objectives and, therefore, would be within
the scope of the agent's employment. On the other hand,
intentional acts causing damage would not further the
objectives of the United States and would fall outside the
scope of employment.
In California, an employee acts within the scope of her
employment if she is carrying out the employer's business
when she takes the action in question.9" This definition
includes some unauthorized conduct, but does not cover
conduct that deviates substantially from the employee's
duties or that is done for personal purposes. 9' Here,
again, negligent acts of customs agents would likely occur
while furthering the employer's business, while inten-
tional conduct would be a substantial deviation from the
agent's duties.
Nadler v. Mann, 951 F.2d 301, 305 (11th Cir. 1992). These courts based their
decision on a brief Supreme Court opinion in which the Court held that Califor-
nia's respondeat superior law applied to the question of whether a soldier in the
United States military was acting within the scope of his employment under the
FTCA. Williams v. United States, 350 U.S. 857 (1955). Recently, however, one
court applied federal common law to determine the scope of employment. Garcia
v. United States, 799 F. Supp. 674, 680 (W.D. Tex. 1992) (reasoning that interests
of uniformity and consistency support application of federal law rather than the
law of the state where the act occurred).
1,9 Garcia, 799 F. Supp. at 682-83 (citing Robertson Tank Lines v. Van Cleave,
468 S.W.2d 354, 359 (Tex. 1971)).
Pelletier, 968 F.2d at 876 (citing Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc., 719
P.2d 676, 679 (Cal. 1986)).
'91 Id.
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Under Florida law, the rule is similar. In Florida, an
employee acts within the scope of his employment if "the
employee [is] doing what his employment contem-
plated. ' 92 This includes actions "of the kind he is em-
ployed to perform," occurring "within the time and space
limits of employment" and motivated "at least in part by a
purpose to serve the master. ' 93 This rule would include
agents' negligent acts as part of their scope of employ-
ment, but would probably not include intentional acts.
Reckless actions, those falling between negligent and in-
tentional conduct, could be within or without the agents'
scope of employment under the law in all three states, de-
pending on the particular circumstances.
If the court applies the federal common law, the actions
would be within the scope of employment if the official
had the intent, even if secondary, to serve the govern-
ment's purpose.94 Recovery from individual agents would
be limited to those cases in which the agent acts solely to
harass or harm the plaintiff.95 Therefore, regardless of
whether state or federal law applies, it appears that cus-
toms agents' actions will have to be fairly egregious to re-
move the actions from within the agents' scope of
employment, depriving the agents of the protection of of-
ficial immunity.
B. CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM
Although it is unlikely that a plaintiff will recover
against an individual customs agent based on common
law tort actions, she may have a damages action based di-
92 Nadler, 951 F.2d at 305 (quoting Morrison Motor Co. v. Manheim Serv.
Corp., 346 So. 2d 102, 104 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)).
93 Id. (quoting Kane Furniture Corp. v. Miranda, 506 So. 2d 1061, 1067 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1987)).
94 Garcia, 799 F. Supp. at 681 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 70, at 503 (5th ed. 1984)).
9s In discussing the pitfalls of the exclusive remedy provision of the Liability
Reform Act, one commentator wrote that when the official's actions include one
of the specific intentional torts enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h), "there is a
good chance that ... a finding will be rendered that the employee acted outside
the scope." Cornell, supra note 4, at 149.
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rectly on the Constitution.9 6 In Bivens v. Six Unknown
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics the defendants ar-
gued that the plaintiff's remedy was a state tort action and
that the Fourth Amendment only limits the government's
actions in searches and seizures.97 The Court rejected
this argument and concluded that the Fourth Amendment
guarantees the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures and that federal courts have the
power to grant relief when these rights are violated. 98
The Court then held that the ordinary relief for such an
invasion of liberty is damages. 99 Thus, the Constitution
serves as a sword, as well as a shield in protecting funda-
mental rights.
The Court identified two situations when damages are
not available directly under the Constitution. 100 First,
where there are "special factors counseling hesitation in
the absence of affirmative action by Congress," the court
will not provide damages relief.'0 ' Second, the plaintiff
has no cause of action if there is an "explicit congres-
sional declaration that persons . . . may not recover
money damages from agents, but must instead be remit-
ted to another remedy, equally effective in the view of
Congress." 102
-' See Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 397 (1971) (holding federal narcotics agents amenable to suit for damages
directly under the Fourth Amendment).
97 Id. Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics made a warrantless entry into
the plaintiff's apartment, searched the apartment, and arrested the plaintiff, all
allegedly without probable cause. The plaintiff sued the agents to recover dam-
ages for the humiliation, embarrassment, and mental suffering that resulted from
the agents' unlawful conduct.
Id. at 395.
9 Id. Justice Harlan, in his concurrence, wrote that "federal courts do have the
power to award damages for violation of 'constitutionally protected interests.' "
Id. at 399. Although the Bivens Court specifically addressed liberty interests, it
appears the rationale equally applies to property interests, which would be the
issue in a suit against customs agents for damage done during customs inspec-
tions. See States Marine Lines v. Schultz, 498 F.2d 1146, 1157 (4th Cir. 1974)
(finding that "the necessity and appropriateness of judicial relief is no less com-
pelling in this case" where property rights are at issue "than it was in Bivens").
- Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396-97.
lo, Id. at 397.
102 Id.
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When applied to actions for damages when customs
agents damage property, the first limitation should not
apply. The defendant may argue that the unique impor-
tance of protecting the country's borders from incoming
contraband is the type of "special factor" to which the
Bivens Court referred. The test for whether an action
should be barred by this factor is whether the agent "oc-
cupies such an 'independent status' in our constitutional
scheme to render a judicially-created remedy against him
inappropriate."' t0 3 Although a customs agent may occupy
such a status due to the nature of border searches, at least
one court has applied a Bivens action in a suit against cus-
toms agents. ' 0 4
The second limitation on the availability of damages di-
rectly under the Constitution will probably also not apply.
In a case with facts similar to the customs property dam-
age scenario, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
a Bivens action was available against a Forest Service offi-
cial who allegedly destroyed the plaintiff's property in vi-
olation of his due process rights. 0 5 Although there was
an adequate alternative remedy available under the
Tucker Act and the Fifth Amendment just compensation
clause, the court found no explicit declaration by Con-
gress that such a claim was an exclusive remedy. 0 6
10- Weiss v. Lehman, 642 F.2d 265, 267 (9th Cir.) (citing Carlson v. Green, 446
U.S. 14, 19 (1980)), vacated and remanded, 454 U.S. 807 (1981), vacated, 676 F.2d
1320 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1103 (1983).
04 States Marine Lines v. Shultz, 498 F.2d 1146, 1156-57 (4th Cir. 1974). It
appears this limitation was not even an issue since the court did not discuss it.
The court held that the only reason a Bivens action would not lie in that case was
because the Bivens Court referred to liberty interests and not to property interests.
The court decided that this difference was immaterial. Id.
105 Weiss, 642 F.2d at 267.
-6 Id. In granting the defendant's writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated
and remanded the case simply "for further consideration in light of Parratt v. Tay-
lor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981)." Weiss, 454 U.S. at 807. The Parratt Court held that a
person's procedural due process rights are not violated when post-deprivation
remedies are available and there is either a necessity for quick state action or when
pre-deprivation process would not be practical. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 539. On re-
mand, the court of appeals in Weiss vacated its earlier judgement. Weiss, 676 F.2d
1320. The appellate court focused not on the availability of the Bivens action, but
rather on the threshold issue of whether the official violated the plaintiff's consti-
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Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that the
availability of an FTCA claim is parallel to a Bivens ac-
tion. 0 7 Thus, a plaintiff may assert both claims. Most
likely, then, the second limitation, preempting a Bivens ac-
tion when Congress has specified another remedy, does
not apply to passengers' suits against customs agents for
damage to their property. Even if an agent argues that
the availability of a Tucker Act or FTCA claim should pre-
clude a Bivens action in this situation, it is clear that those
remedies are effective. 108 The plaintiff, therefore, may sue
the agents for violation of her constitutional rights. A
constitutional claim will fail, however, unless the plaintiff
can prove that the agent's actions violated specific consti-
tutional rights. The plaintiff will most likely succeed
under either the Fourth or Fifth Amendment.
1. Fourth Amendment Claim
First, the property owner may sue the agent for a viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment unreasonable search pro-
hibition. 0 9 The Supreme Court rejected such a claim in
United States v. Ramsey." 0 In Ramsey customs agents
opened several pieces of international mail without a war-
rant or probable cause. They did, however, have reason-
able cause to suspect a violation of the customs laws. The
issue before the Court was whether such an inspection
was constitutional. In holding the inspection constitu-
tional,"'I the Court reasoned that border searches "pursu-
ant to the long-standing right of the sovereign to protect
itself by stopping and examining persons and property
crossing into this country, are reasonable simply by virtue
tutional rights. The court found no constitutional rights were violated and, there-
fore, no Bivens action was available. Id. at 1322. Thus, the court's reasoning on
the alternative remedies issue is still persuasive.
107 Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20 (1980).
108 See supra notes 3-72 and accompanying text.
109 The Bivens case itself authorized a damages suit based on this Fourth
Amendment protection. Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
ito 431 U.S. 606 (1977).
11 Id. at 624-25.
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of the fact that they occur at the border."' 12 Furthermore,
the Court recited its earlier ruling that border searches
were not intended to fall under the Fourth Amendment
warrant provision.' 13
At least one court has broadly construed this presump-
tion of reasonableness. In United States v. Objebode"14 the
defendant alleged a violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights when he was the sole passenger searched by cus-
toms agents. He claimed that the agent's motive for
searching only him was that he was the only black passen-
ger on the plane. He also contended that the agents had
no reasonable suspicion to conduct the search. The court
rejected Objebode's arguments as groundless and quoted
Ramsey in holding that all border searches are reason-
able.115 The court then held that even racially motivated
searches were reasonable."t 6
112 Id. at 616. The search in Ramsey took place at the New York Post Office after
the mail arrived at Kennedy Airport via international mail. The Court identified
the Post Office as a "border" for the purposes of border searches. Id. at 609 n.2.
In an earlier case, the Court held that there are certain non-border locations
where officials conduct searches which are considered "functional equivalents" of
the border. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-73 (1973) (giv-
ing as one example an airport where international flights land and searches of
their passengers take place). Thus, the border search reasoning in Ramsey applies
in the case of a customs inspection of baggage from an international flight.
"3 Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 617 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925)).
114 957 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1291 (1993).
115 Id. at 1223.
116 Id. (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976)). In
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte the Court upheld the constitutionality of check point
inspections for illegal aliens close to the Mexican border. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
at 563. Although the court did not believe that the stops in Martinez-Fuerte were
made solely on the basis of ancestry, the court noted that selection based upon
ancestry would be constitutional. Id. at 563 & n.16. The Court reasoned that the
Border Patrol had wide discretion and needed no special justification for stopping
a car because the intrusion was minimal, generally consisting only of questioning.
Id. at 563-64.
The Objebode case seems distinguishable on this fact. A customs inspection is
much more intrusive than questioning by the Border Patrol because of the physi-
cal search that takes place. Furthermore, the case of United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885-87 (1975), held that ancestry could not be the sole rea-
son for making a roving-patrol stop near the border. The Brignoni-Ponce Court
found that such a stop is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 884.
The Martinez-Fuerte Court apparently found the check point stop less intrusive
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Therefore, it seems that a Fourth Amendment claim
against a customs agent who has damaged someone's
property will likely fail solely because it is a border search.
Although the cases previously cited concerned the issue
of the reasonableness of conducting the search in the first
place, it appears that the rule of presumed reasonableness
will apply to cases where the method of the search is at
issue. For example, in Locks v. Three Unidentified Customs
Service Agents i17 the court dismissed just such a claim. The
court in Locks does, however, provide some hope for
plaintiffs by holding that some customs searches may be
unreasonable if the agents conduct them in a "particularly
offensive manner.""" The Locks court cites two cases in
support of its holding." 9 In the first case cited, the
Supreme Court ruled that the exhaustive search of a
cabin, the seizure of its entire contents, and the removal
of those contents 200 miles away was unreasonable. 20 In
the second case, the Supreme Court found a search un-
reasonable where the official compelled the person to
open a desk and a safe, and then made a general explora-
than the roving-patrol stop and distinguished the holding in Brignoni-Ponce on this
basis. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 563-64. This distinction, however, seems
quite illusory.
,,7 59 F. Supp. 1131, 1134-35 (E.D. Pa. 1990). In reaching this decision, the
court cited both Ramsey and Carroll for the proposition that most customs searches
are reasonable. Id. The facts of Locks are contained in the introduction to this
Comment.
11 Id. at 1135. The Supreme Court in Ramsey refused to decide whether a bor-
der search could be unreasonable for this reason. Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 618 n.13.
In expounding on the general principle laid out in Ramsey, the court in United
States v. Johnson, 991 F.2d 1287 (7th Cir. 1993), stated: "[A] customs official
may search a border entrant's luggage and outer clothing in a reasonable manner...
on a random basis, if the search and seizure may be characterized as routine." Id.
at 1291 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 514 (1st
Cir. 1988)). Unfortunately, the issue in Johnson was not the reasonableness of the
manner of the search, but rather the reasonableness of conducting the search at
all. Id. at 1290. Therefore, the court did not expand on the "reasonable manner"
idea.
19 Locks, 759 F. Supp. at 1134 (citing Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346
(1957) (per curiam) and Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344
(1931)).
-I Kremen, 353 U.S. at 347. The officials had arrest warrants for two of the four
people present at the cabin, and the search took place during the course of those
arrests, but without a corresponding search warrant.
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tory search.' 2 ' The Court declined to formulate a test for
determining unreasonableness, but instead opined that
the court or jury should decide the reasonableness stan-
dard according to the facts of each case.
22
In applying the offensive manner test to the case before
it, the Locks court held that the agents' actions did not vio-
late the Fourth Amendment. 23 The court decided that
the agents, at most, acted negligently in using an alter-
nate, less damaging means of inspection. 24 The court
held that simple negligence is not violative of the Fourth
Amendment and that the agents had no duty to search in
the "least intrusive manner". 125 The court did, however,
limit its decision to the particular facts and specifically
stated that agents do not have "unbounded
discretion."' 126
The Locks decision, then, leaves open the possibility of a
Fourth Amendment unreasonable search claim in limited
situations. First, the plaintiff must be able to demonstrate
that the agents conducted the search in a particularly of-
fensive manner. Most customs inspections, however, will
not rise to this level. Second, the plaintiff must allege and
prove something more than simple negligence in the
agents' actions. Most cases of property damage during in-
spection will likely fall into the category of simple negli-
gence. It is not unimaginable, however, that a plaintiff
would be able to demonstrate that the agents acted reck-
lessly, or even intentionally, in damaging the plaintiff's
property. In these instances, the plaintiff should recover.
121 Go-Bart Importing Co., 282 U.S. at 358. The official compelled the search by
pretension of right and by threat of force. Id.
122 Id. at 357. In neither this case, nor in Kremen, did the search take place at the
border or its equivalent. Their applicability to the present issue is, therefore, sus-
pect, despite the citation by the Locks court.
2 3 Locks, 759 F. Supp. at 1135.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 1135 n.7.
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2. Fifth Amendment Claim
Property owners may also sue customs agents for dam-
age to their property under the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.'2 7 The Supreme Court, in Davis v.
Passman,128 found that a cause of action and a damages
remedy may be implied under the Fifth Amendment for a
violation of the Due Process Clause. Prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Davis, the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals had allowed a Bivens action against customs agents
under the Due Process Clause. 29 The plaintiff in States
Marine Lines v. Shultz 13o based his claim on the fact that
customs agents had refused either to return the plaintiff's
seized cargo or to institute forfeiture proceedings against
the cargo pursuant to federal law. The plaintiff alleged
that the prolonged detention unconstitutionally deprived
him of his property. After holding that the plaintiff had
stated a cause of action, the court remanded the case for
further consideration. 13'
Provided that plaintiffs have an action under the Due
Process Clause, the primary issue involves determining in
which situations customs agents violate due process
rights. Determination of this issue is confusing because of
the nature of due process rights and the conflicting opin-
ions on the topic. In Daniels v. Williams '32 the Supreme
Court identified two primary purposes of the Due Process
Clause. 33 The clause requires that governmental agents
127 U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating "nor [shall any person] be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law").
128 442 U.S. 228, 245-49 (1979). In Davis the Court held that an employee of a
Congressman had a remedy for a discriminatory discharge from her job. Id.
12) States Marine Lines v. Shultz, 498 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1974). For a discus-
sion of this case as it applies to the availability of a Bivens action against customs
agents in general, see supra note 99 and accompanying text.
13o States Marine Lines, 498 F.2d 1146.
131 Id. at 1156-57. No opinion was issued for the remand hearing.
132 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
131 See id. This case involved a claim based on the Fourteenth Amendment
rather than the Fifth. The Fourteenth Amendment reads in part, "nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The only difference between the two due process
clauses is that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to states. Therefore, this char-
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follow certain procedures when depriving any person of
"life, liberty or property" to ensure fairness, and bars
"certain government actions regardless of the fairness of
the procedures used to implement them" in order to pre-
vent the government from using its power "for purposes
of oppression." 34
In his concurrence in Daniels v. Williams, Justice Stevens
expanded on the nature of due process rights. 35 Justice
Stevens argued that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Pro-
cess Clause includes three types of protection: the spe-
cific protections included in the Bill of Rights, substantive
due process rights that bar arbitrary government action
despite fair procedures, and procedural due process
rights that guarantee fair and appropriate procedural
safeguards. 3 6 The right upon which the plaintiff bases
her claim has important implications for the outcome of
the claim. In a substantive due process claim, for exam-
ple, the plaintiff will allege a deprivation of property
based solely on the official's actions, not on inadequate or
unfair procedures governing the official's actions.' 37
Thus, the constitutional violation is complete as soon as
the official acts, and the claim will not be denied based on
acterization of the rights protected by Fourteenth Amendment due process
should apply equally to Fifth Amendment due process. See Gibson v. Matthews,
926 F.2d 532, 537 (6th Cir. 1991) (applying the Supreme Court's decision in Dan-
iels to a Fifth Amendment due process claim); Committee of United States Citizens
Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (applying Justice
Stevens's characterization of substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment in Daniels to a Fifth Amendment due process claim); Locks v. Three
Unidentified Customs Serv. Agents, 759 F. Supp. 1131, 1136 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (ap-
plying the holding of Daniels to a Fifth Amendment due process claim against cus-
toms agents).
134 Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331-32 (quoting Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 277 (1856)).
1s5 Id. at 337-43 (Stevens, J., concurring).
116 Id. at 337. For our discussion here, only the last two rights are important.
Because customs agents are federal, not state, officials, the plaintiff whose prop-
erty the customs agents damaged will bring suit for a violation of Fifth Amend-
ment, not Fourteenth Amendment, due process. Unlike the Fourteenth
Amendment due process clause, which applies the Bill of Rights to state officials,
the Fifth Amendment due process clause does not make such an application be-
cause the Bill of Rights already applies to federal officials.
137 Id. at 338.
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the availability of alternative or post-deprivation
remedies. 38
Procedural claims, on the other hand, include allega-
tions that while the deprivation itself may have been legit-
imate, procedural safeguards are inadequate to insure
that the deprivation was fair.' 3 9 Another procedural due
process claim may allege that the deprivation, although
not unconstitutional, was made by mistake or negligence,
and that there are no appropriate procedures to remedy
the deprivation. 40 The inquiry in these claims focuses on
the procedures followed, not the deprivation itself, as in
substantive claims.'41
Having identified the two causes of action available
under Fifth Amendment due process protection, the next
step is to identify when the owner of property damaged by
customs agents may have one of these claims. In most
cases, plaintiffs will lack a procedural due process claim.
Although case law is sparse on this issue, 42 it seems likely
that the procedures in place for conducting customs
searches and detentions do not violate due process. Fur-
thermore, an allegation that negligent or mistaken depri-
vation has occurred without adequate procedural
remedies will also likely fail because of the administrative
138 Id.
1'9 Id.
140 Id. at 339.
141 Id.
142 The primary case in which a property owner sued customs agents based on
the violation of his procedural due process rights is States Marine Lines v. Shultz,
498 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1979). The court apparently treated the plaintiff's claim
in this case as a procedural due process claim without naming it as such. The
defendants in the case had seized the plaintiff's property and, after sixteen
months, had not returned it or instituted forfeiture proceedings against it. Stat-
utes governing the process to be followed after seizure required expeditious ad-
ministrative and judicial action, but imposed no time limits. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1602-
1604 (Supp. IV 1992). The court held that the statutes required implication of
some time limit to be constitutional, but declined to set precise limits. States
Marine Lines, 498 F.2d at 1154-55. The agents' delay in this case failed to comply
with the implied time limits, depriving the plaintiff of his property rights without
due process of law. Id. at 1157.
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proceedings available for recovery.143
The Locks case illustrates this point. Although the court
did not indicate that Locks's claim was based on proce-
dural due process, it appears that the court considered it
to be such a claim. 144 The court identified the agents'
possible noncompliance with a regulation as the only basis
for a due process violation. 45 The court then held that
the agents had complied with the regulations and, there-
fore, had not violated the plaintiff's due process rights. 46
Thus, it seems likely that a procedural due process claim
will fail unless the plaintiff can prove noncompliance with
a regulation. Even then, the court may bar the claim since
other remedies are typically adequate.
The plaintiff's best chance of recovery, then, is a sub-
stantive due process claim. Although no court has de-
cided how substantive due process applies to customs
agents' actions, other types of cases provide some gui-
dance on the requirements of such a claim.
These cases deal primarily with the types of conduct
that deprive persons of their substantive due process
rights. As stated above, the Supreme Court in Daniels
characterized substantive due process as barring certain
governmental actions to prevent the government from us-
ing its power "for the purposes of oppression."'' 47 In his
concurrence to that case, Justice Stevens described sub-
stantive due process as barring arbitrary government ac-
143 See 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (Supp. H 1990) (giving property owners the right to file
a claim with the Customs Service).
144 The court apparently was confused over Locks's due process claim, indicat-
ing that his theory of recovery under the Fifth Amendment was unclear. Locks v.
Three Unidentified Customs Serv. Agents, 759 F. Supp. 1131, 1136 (E.D. Pa.
1990). Although Locks could have been claiming a substantive due process viola-
tion, the court focused on whether the agents deprived Locks of his property with-
out due process. Id. This emphasis on process by the court demonstrates that the
court thought the claim was based on procedural due process rights.
145 Id.
146, Id. The court also pointed out that, at most, the agents had acted negli-
gently and that negligence does not rise to the level of a due process violation.
Id.; see infra note 149 and accompanying text.
-4 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986).
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tion.14 a In applying these characterizations in subsequent
cases, lower courts and the Supreme Court have at-
tempted to set a standard for when government action is
arbitrary or oppressive. The results are incongruent. 149
The courts in these cases generally employ two lines of
analysis. The first line of analysis focuses on the govern-
ment actor's state of mind, while the second concentrates
on the severity of the action itself in determining whether
a constitutional violation occurred.
One of the first cases analyzing the official's state of
mind was Daniels. In that case the Supreme Court held
that negligence, or the lack of due care, on the part of a
government official cannot violate the Due Process
Clause.' The Court, however, specifically refused to de-
cide whether something less than intentional conduct, but
more than negligence, such as gross negligence or reck-
lessness, could violate such rights.' 5 ' Since Daniels, sev-
eral courts using an analysis focusing on state of mind
have decided this issue.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has addressed the
issue in several cases. For example, in Nishiyama v. Dickson
County ' 52 the plaintiff alleged that the police had violated
his daughter's substantive due process right to life by act-
ing with gross negligence. 1' 5  The court first recognized
the holding in Daniels v. Williams that simple negligence
14I Id. at 337 (Stevens, J., concurring).
149 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and
Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309 (1993).
1. 0 Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328. Although this case involved procedural due pro-
cess, other courts have applied it to substantive due process claims. See, e.g., Salas
v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 306 (5th Cir. 1992); Gibson v. Matthews, 926 F.2d
532, 537 (6th Cir. 1991); Germany v. Vance, 868 F.2d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 1989).
151 Daniels, 474 U.S. at 334 n.3. This decision implies that intentional conduct
will constitute a deprivation. Thus, in Smith v. Eley, 675 F. Supp. 1301 (D. Utah
1987), the court held that where a police officer was negligent in determining the
lawfulness of his actions but acted intentionally to deprive the plaintiff of his con-
stitutional rights, the officer may have violated the plaintiff's due process rights.
Id. at 1305.
152 814 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
11-1 The police officers had allowed an inmate (a convicted felon) to use a patrol
car without supervision. The inmate used the patrol car to stop the plaintiff's
daughter and then he beat her to death.
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cannot deprive persons of their due process rights. 54 It
then held gross negligence sufficient to constitute such a
deprivation, stating that an "allegation... of gross negli-
gence on the part of the defendants was sufficient to
charge them with arbitrary use of government power."'1
55
The term gross negligence, according to the court,
"evades easy definition," but basically involves a person
"intentionally [doing] something unreasonable with disre-
gard to a known risk or a risk so obvious that he must be
assumed to have been aware of it, and of a magnitude
such that it is highly probable that harm will follow.'
' 5 6
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reaffirmed the use
of this standard and further clarified the definition of
gross negligence/recklessness as it applied to substantive
due process violations in Vinson v. Campbell County Fiscal
Court,'5 7 Jones v. Sherrill,158 and Gibson v. Matthews.' 59 In
Jones the court held that actions constituting gross negli-
gence must be sufficient to charge that the government
official acted outrageously or arbitrarily used his power. 
60
According to the court, such action involves wanton disre-
gard or reckless indifference to the plaintiff's rights. 16' In
Vinson the court characterized gross negligence as an
egregious abuse of governmental power. 162 Finally, the
court held in Gibson that reckless or arbitrary actions by
government officials may violate substantive due process
15 Id. at 282.
155 Id. Later in the opinion, the court used the term "reckless indifference" to
describe the state of mind of the government actors. Id. at 283. It appears from
this and the court's definition of gross negligence that the two terms are
interchangeable.
156 Id. at 282. Applying this definition, the court held that the defendants acted
with gross negligence. Id. at 283.
157 820 F.2d 194 (6th Cir. 1987) (involving a substantive due process claim by
the plaintiff arising from an alleged false imprisonment).
15" 827 F.2d 1102 (6th Cir. 1987) (involving a high speed chase by police of a
fleeing offender during which the plaintiff, an innocent bystander, was injured).
159 926 F.2d 532 (6th Cir. 1991).
160 Jones, 827 F.2d at 1106.
161 Id. at 1107.
162 Vinson, 820 F.2d at 198. The court equated egregious abuse of power with
malicious and intentional abuse of power. Id. at 198, 201.
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rights when they cause a deprivation. 63 The court stated
that reckless or arbitrary actions would occur if the official
was otherwise able to undertake another action to prevent
the harm without producing an offsetting danger, yet
failed to do so. t64
Recently, however, the Sixth Circuit has used the sec-
ond line of reasoning, focusing on the severity of the offi-
cial's action, not his state of mind. In two cases the court
applied a test that looked to whether the official's actions
shock the conscience of the judges. 65 Neither case men-
tioned Nishiyama or its progeny, so it is unclear what effect
these recent cases have.
Other circuits that seem to use the state of mind analy-
sis include the Third, 66 Fifth, 67 Seventh,' 68 and Tenth. 69
These circuits apply reckless or reckless indifference stan-
dards for the threshold of when a government official vio-
lates substantive due process rights. 70
The second line of analysis focuses on the egregious-
ness of the official's action. The courts using this analysis
163 Gibson, 926 F.2d at 537 (citing Nishiyama, 814 F.2d 277). The plaintiff in
Gibson, a prison inmate, sued the defendant government official alleging a viola-
tion of her substantive due process rights by refusing to help her get an abortion.
164 Id.
165 Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 988 F.2d 649, 657 (6th Cir. 1993); Newell v.
Brown, 981 F.2d 880, 886 (6th Cir. 1992). In both cases the claims involved the
allegation that a certain procedure used by the officials violated the plaintiff's sub-
stantive due process rights.
166 Fagan v. City of Vineland, Nos. 92-5481, 92-5482, 92-5551, and 92-5594,
1993 WL 290386, at *12 (3d Cir. Aug. 5, 1993) (applying analysis in case in which
plaintiff's spouse was killed during police pursuit of third party).
I67 Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 307 (5th Cir. 1992) (applying analysis in
case in which plaintiffs sued the sheriff for actions taken during a hostage
standoff).
6- Ross v. United States, 910 F.2d 1422, 1433 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying analy-
sis in case where plaintiff sued police officers for preventing private individuals
from attempting to save a drowning victim); Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d
1211, 1219-20 (7th Cir. 1988) (applying analysis in case where an official failed to
provide rescue services to a woman who had requested them), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1065 (1989).
169 Medina v. City of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1992) (applying
analysis in police pursuit case).
170 Fagan, 1993 WL 290386, at "12; Salas, 980 F.2d at 307; Medina, 960 F.2d at
1496; Ross, 910 F.2d at 1433 (citing Bieneman v. City of Chicago, 864 F.2d 463,
466 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1080 (1989)).
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apply a "shocks the conscience" standard, taken from the
Supreme Court's decision in Rochin v. California.17 1 The
Supreme Court more recently applied this standard in
Collins v. City of Harker Heights.'7 2 In Collins the plaintiff's
husband was killed after entering a sewer to do repairs.
The Court characterized one of the plaintiff's claims as
arguing that "the city's 'deliberate indifference' to Col-
lins's safety was arbitrary Government action that must
'shock the conscience' of federal judges."' 73  The Court
held that the city's omissions were not conscience-shock-
ing. 174 Although Collins indicates the Supreme Court's
willingness to use this standard, rather than a recklessness
standard, the Court does not specifically state that the
shocks the conscience standard is the proper standard for
all substantive due process claims. Furthermore, at least
one circuit court has used the recklessness standard after
Collins,'75 and one commentator recently noted that the
Court appears to use an ad hoc balancing test, at times
using the shocks the conscience standard and at other
times, a different standard. 176
Several circuit courts have also taken the shocks the
conscience standard from Rochin and applied it in cases
involving substantive due process claims.' 77 Other circuit
M7' 342 U.S. 165 (1952), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The
Court here held that in a criminal case, admitting evidence obtained in a method
that shocks the conscience violates the due process clause. Id. at 172-74. The
Court did not say whether anything less severe could also be a violation.
172 112 S. Ct. 1061 (1992).
173 Id. at 1069 (citing Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172).
174 Id. at 1070.
175 Fagan, 1993 WL 290386, at *12.
176 Fallon, supra note 149, at 325.
'77 See, e.g., Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 963 F.2d 1481, 1486 (11 th Cir.
1992) (holding that "[u]nless the alleged conduct.., shocks the conscience, sub-
stantive due process is not implicated" where the plaintiff claims officials' retalia-
tion for whistle-blowing violated his rights), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1586 (1993);
Spear v. Town of W. Hartford, 954 F.2d 63, 68 (2d Cir.) (applying the standard
where a newspaper claimed city officials violated its substantive due process rights
by filing a racketeering charge against it), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 66 (1992); Temkin
v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 720-23 (4th Cir. 1991) (adopting
explicitly the shocks the conscience standard for cases where innocent bystanders
are injured during police pursuit of offenders), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1172 (1992);
Reese v. Kennedy, 865 F.2d 186, 187 (8th Cir. 1989) (applying standard to case
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courts, however, seem to take a more ad hoc approach. In
Committee of United States Citizens v. Reagan 178 the D.C. Cir-
cuit opined that substantive due process protects against
oppressive use of government power 179 or the abuse of
government power that shocks the conscience' 8 ° and that
its touchstone is protection against arbitrary government
action.' 8 ' According to the court, whether a reckless act is
an oppressive use of power or an abuse of power shocking
the conscience depends on whether the "constitutional
line" has been crossed. 182 "[R]eckless conduct is a neces-
sary, though not sufficient, condition for deprivations of
due process." 183 "[W]hat constitutes a deprivation of our
citizens' liberty or property" without due process of law
"must be gauged by the circumstances."' 84 This language
indicates the D.C. Circuit uses an ad hoc balancing test
approach to the issue without any set standard for when a
violation has occurred.
The First Circuit has held that there are two alternative
tests to use in determining if substantive due process
rights are implicated. In Pittsley v. Warish 185 the court
opined that an analysis of Supreme Court substantive due
where plaintiff sued police for evicting her from her home). But see Roach v. City
of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 297 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding negligence or gross
negligence not enough but not applying shocks the conscience standard in police
pursuit case); Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 871 (4th Cir. 1988) (applying delib-
erate indifference standard in case where plaintiff was in government custody);
Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 795-97 (11 th Cir. 1987) (holding deliberate
indifference sufficient for substantive due process violation in case where foster
child was injured while in foster parents' custody), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065
(1989).
178 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The plaintiffs alleged that certain United
States officials had acted in reckless disregard for the plaintiffs' safety in funding
the Contras of Nicaragua. The plaintiffs, citizens of the United States living in
Nicaragua and victims of some of the Contras' violence, based their claim on the
substantive due process protections of the Fifth Amendment.
'79 Id. at 943 (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).
11o Id. at 944 (citing Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1981)).
I'l Id. at 943 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1979)).
1'12 Id. at 949 (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)).
1s3 Id. at 951.
"ll Id. at 953. The court then held that in this particular case, the defendants
had not crossed the constitutional line considering the circumstances. Id.
"' 927 F.2d 3 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 226 (1991).
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process cases shows that two tests are appropriate."8 6 If
the plaintiff does not prove that a specific liberty or prop-
erty interest was violated by the official, the shocks the
conscience standard applies.18 7 If the plaintiff does prove
such a violation, however, then the action need not be
conscience-shocking. 8 8  This latter test was apparently
applied in the previously discussed case of Germany v.
Vance.'" 9 The court in Germany applied a reckless indiffer-
ence standard to a substantive due process claim in which
the plaintiff proved a violation of her right of access to the
courts. 190
Therefore, the standard a court will apply in any given
case seems to depend on the court and possibly the type
of case.' 91 The best standard is open to speculation. 92 It
seems safe to assume, however, based on the case law that
the court will either apply a shocks the conscience, a reck-
less, or a reckless indifference standard.
Applying these standards, property owners may have
Fifth Amendment substantive due process claims against
customs agents who have damaged their property. 193  If
186 Id. at 6.
187 Id. (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)).
188 Id. (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
868 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1989).
'o Id. at 18.
191 See, e.g., Pittsley, 927 F.2d at 6 (holding different tests apply depending on
whether plaintiff can prove violation of specific interests); Temkin v. Frederick
County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 721, 723 n.5 (4th Cir. 1991) (opining that a dif-
ferent standard than shocks the conscience may apply in cases where plaintiff was
in government custody at time of alleged violation); Fagan v. City of Vineland,
Nos. 92-5481, 92-5482, 92-5551, and 92-5594, 1993 WL 290386, at *10-11 (3d
Cir. Aug. 5, 1993) (opining that although the reckless indifference standard ap-
plied, the shocks the conscience standard may be appropriate where alleged viola-
tion occurs from government omissions rather than conduct and such omission
"resemble[s] ordinary state negligence claims" such as failure to provide a safe
work place).
192 See William Burnham, Separating Constitutional and Common-Law Torts: A Cri-
tique and a Proposed Constitutional Theory of Duty, 73 MINN. L. REV. 515, 517 (1989)
(rejecting state of mind framework and proposing a theory of duty to determine
which torts are constitutional violations); Michael Wells & Thomas A. Eaton, Sub-
stantive Due Process and the Scope of Constitutional Torts, 18 GA. L. REv. 201, 242
(1984) (arguing recklessness standard is sufficient for constitutional torts).
'93 While all the cases cited involving substantive due process claims involve
claims of deprivation of liberty or life, such claims most likely also apply to depri-
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the agent negligently damages the property, the plaintiff
will not recover. 94 On the other hand, if the agent acts
intentionally to deprive the person of her property, the
owner should recover damages in courts using a state of
mind framework, and might recover in others if the con-
duct was egregious enough to shock the conscience of the
judge.' 95 Whether an action falling between intentional
and merely negligent conduct will create liability depends
on the court. If the conduct is severe enough, it might
shock the conscience of the judge and constitute a viola-
tion in courts recognizing the shocks the conscience test.
If the official was reckless or showed reckless indifference,
then courts recognizing the reckless or reckless indiffer-
ence standard would find that the official violated the
plaintiff's rights. Whether conduct is reckless, however,
depends on each court's definition of that term. The best
test in the customs inspection situation is the test applied
vation of property claims. In Ginaitt v. Haronian, 806 F. Supp. 311 (D.R.I. 1992),
for example, the plaintiff sued city officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating
his substantive due process rights by terminating his disability pension payments
and medical benefits arbitrarily. The court recognized this property interest as
protected by substantive due process. Ginaitt, 806 F. Supp. at 315. The court
went on to find that the defendants had violated the plaintiff's rights because, in
terminating his benefits, they had acted with blatant disregard of rules governing
such actions, and because they had acted discriminatingly and arbitrarily. Id. at
316.
In the case of Shaner v. United States, 976 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1944 (1993), the plaintiff sued the government claiming officials had
violated the Fifth Amendment by depriving him of his property interest in a loan.
The court held that if the plaintiff had a property interest in a future loan, he
would have to show gross negligence in order to prove a deprivation. Id. at 995.
These cases show that the concepts concerning substantive due process applied in
the cases involving liberty interests will probably apply equally to claims involving
deprivation of property.
'9 See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (holding negligence does
not constitute a due process violation).
195 Seemingly, for plaintiffs to have a cause of action based on an agent's inten-
tional action, the agent must act with the purpose of depriving the plaintiff of her
rights. Thus, in Locks the agents were not liable even though they acted intention-
ally in taking apart the sculpture because they were not acting with the purpose of
depriving Locks of his rights. Locke v. Three Unidentified Customs Serv. Agents,
759 F. Supp. 1131 (E.D. Pa. 1990); cf. Smith v. Eley, 675 F. Supp. 1301, 1305 (D.
Utah 1987) (holding a police officer liable under the due process clause where he
acted to harm and deprive the plaintiff of his rights).
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in Gibson. 196 Under that test, the court would find liability
if the agent could have taken less damaging actions with-
out jeopardizing the effectiveness of the search. There-
fore, in a situation similar to Locks, the agents should have
been liable since they had an equally effective, alternative
means of inspecting the sculpture by using the x-ray
machine at the end of the terminal. 19 7
3. Official Immunity
Even if the plaintiff can state a Fourth or Fifth Amend-
ment claim against customs agents, official immunity may
protect the agents from suit.' 98 In three primary cases,
the Supreme Court has determined the law of official im-
munity as it applies to federal executive officers.' 99 In
Butz v. Economou the Supreme Court decided whether cer-
tain Department of Agriculture officials were entitled to
absolute immunity in a suit for alleged violations of an-
other's constitutional rights.2 0 0 The government argued,
and the trial court held, that executive officials are abso-
lutely immune from actions taken that violate another's
constitutional rights if the actions are within the outer pe-
rimeter of their authority and are discretionary, even if
done knowingly and deliberately. The Supreme Court re-
jected this position, holding that Barr v. Matteo,2 0 ' relied
on by both the government and the trial court, did not
control because it did not involve actions violating consti-
tutional rights.2 °2 Finding that federal executive officers
196 See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
197 The court, however, found the agents at most negligent. Locks, 759 F. Supp.
at 1135.
198 The immunity available here is different than that available under the Liabil-
ity Reform Act, which does not apply when the plaintiff alleges constitutional vio-
lations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 1993).
-o See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1986); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800 (1982); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
200 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
20, 360 U.S. 569 (1959) (holding an executive official's false and damaging pub-
lication of information about two employees privileged because issuing the publi-
cation was within the official's authority).
202 Butz, 438 U.S. at 478, 495.
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should have the same immunity as state officials in suits
for constitutional violations,2 °3 the Court held that "fed-
eral executive officials exercising discretion are entitled only
to the qualified immunity" held by state officials.20 4
Four years later, the Court clarified the concept of qual-
ified immunity in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.20 5 Citing Butz, the
Harlow Court stated that executive officials typically have
qualified immunity in suits alleging constitutional viola-
tions.20 6 This immunity is an affirmative defense pled by
the defendant and is generally available only to officials
performing discretionary functions.20 7 Next, the Court
laid out the test for qualified immunity, changing the law
as stated in other cases such as Scheuer v. Rhodes20 8 and
Wood v. Strickland.20 9 The Harlow Court held that the offi-
cial is liable for conduct violating "clearly established stat-
utory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.121 0  This test eliminated the
subjective element of the older tests and provided that al-
legations of malice are no longer sufficient by themselves
to make the immunity inapplicable. 2 1 ' Although this test
could be read to provide immunity to an official who
knowingly violates a person's rights, other statements
made in the opinion indicate that this reading is incorrect.
203 Id. at 500.
2 Id. at 507 (emphasis added). The Court had previously held that state exec-
utive officers were immune if the officers had reasonable grounds, coupled with a
good faith belief, to believe that their actions were constitutional. Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974). The exception to this rule is that there is
absolute immunity for certain special functions, including the judicial and
prosecutorial functions. Butz, 438 U.S. at 508-09.
2o 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
2- Id. at 807.
207 Id. at 815-16.
208 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974).
2- 420 U.S. 308 (1975). The Wood Court held that there was no qualified im-
munity if the official "knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took...
would violate the [plaintiff's] constitutional rights, or if he took the actions with the
malicious intent to" deprive the plaintiff's rights. Id. at 322 (emphasis added).
21o Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. In subsequent decisions, the test became known as
an "objective legal reasonableness" test. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 639 (1986).
211 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817.
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The Court restated the test as allowing immunity if the
official "neither knew nor should have known" that her
actions violated the plaintiff's rights.21 Furthermore, the
Court stated that by focusing on objective factors, they
"provide no license to lawless conduct. 2 1 3
To determine what an official knew or should have
known in order to satisfy the qualified immunity test, the
law must clearly establish which conduct violates constitu-
tional rights.21 4 The Supreme Court expanded on this is-
sue in the case of Anderson v. Creighton.21 5 The Court in
that case held that the "[c]ontours of the right [allegedly
violated] must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable offi-
cial would understand that what he is doing violates that
right.121 6 The Court went on to state that the very action
need not have been held unlawful, but that the unlawful-
ness must be apparent in light of the existing law.217
Although no cases have applied qualified immunity to
customs agents after Harlow,2 1 8 several assumptions can
be made as to its application. First, the defense may not
always be available because it only applies to discretionary
conduct.21 9 In the case of negligent damage to property
during inspection, the level of decision making necessary
for an action to be discretionary will typically be lacking.
212 Id. at 819.
213 Id. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun in their concurrence stated
that the test does not "allow the official who actually knows that he was violating the
law to escape liability for his actions, even if he could not 'reasonably have been
expected' to know what he actually did know." Id. at 821.
214 Id. at 818.
215 483 U.S. 635 (1986).
216 Id. at 640.
217 Id.
218 In two cases prior to Harlow, courts applied the immunity to Customs
agents. See Benson v. Hightower, 633 F.2d 868, 870 (9th Cir. 1980); Shelton v.
United States Customs Serv., 565 F.2d 1140, 1141 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
Both of these cases applied the test using both the subjective and the objective
criteria and were based on facts different from a property damage during inspec-
tion scenario. Therefore, they provide little support in the application of the im-
munity to customs agents sued by damaged property owners. The cases do,
however, show that customs agents are considered executive officers and that the
defense is available to them.
219 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982).
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The carrying out of a routine inspection is probably min-
isterial, not discretionary. Second, if the immunity does
apply, the requirement that the law be clearly established
may benefit the defendant. 220 As indicated earlier, there
are few cases based on suits against customs agents for
constitutional violations. Therefore, the defendant will
have a strong argument that he could not have reasonably
known his actions violated clearly established rights.22 '
IV. AIRLINE LIABILITY
Since suits against the United States and individual cus-
toms agents for damage done to property during customs
inspections provide virtually no relief in most cases, crea-
tive plaintiffs may attempt to sue the airline on which they
travelled. This alternative, however, is likely to produce
little, if any, recovery.
An airline's liability for damage to or loss of its passen-
gers' property is covered by the airline's tariff.222 Gener-
ally, these tariffs are contracts between the carrier and the
passenger governing their rights and liabilities. 23 In
these tariffs, airlines attempt to limit or exculpate them-
selves from liability in certain situations including loss or
damage to baggage. Federal common law governs the ef-
fectiveness and fairness of these limitations. 2 4 According
to federal common law, the airline may not totally excul-
pate itself from liability.225 It may, however, limit its lia-
220 Id. at 818.
221 In fact, in one case dealing with an alleged substantive due process violation
by a law enforcement official, the court found that in applying qualified immunity,
it was significant that the law on substantive due process was not clear. Salas v.
Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 310 (5th Cir. 1992). More particularly, the court found
that "[e]ven today, it remains uncertain whether officials who cause harm by gross
negligence can violate the due process clause." Id.
222 Martin E. Rose & Beth E. McAllister, The Effect of Post-Deregulation Court Deci-
sions on Air Carriers Liability for Lost, Delayed or Damaged Baggage, 55J. AIR L. & COM.
653, 656 (1990).
223 Id. at 669.
224 First Pa. Bank, N.A. v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 731 F.2d 1113, 1120 (3d Cir.
1984).
22-5 Rose & McAllister, supra note 222, at 678 (citing Klicker v. Northwest Air-
lines, 563 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1977)).
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bility if the passenger has the option of purchasing
increased coverage and if the carrier gives the passenger
notice of the limit and the increased valuation option.22 6
Thus, when a passenger sues the airline for property
damage, the tariff's terms bind the passenger, and the
plaintiff must base his suit on contract theory. 27 The pas-
senger cannot avoid the terms of the contract by forming
the complaint in terms of bailment or tort.228 As a result,
the liability limitation almost always applies. As a tradeoff
for the limitation, the airline concedes its negligence in
cases of property damage and, therefore, assumes liability
up to the tariff's limit.2 29 In the normal situation, then,
the airline will reimburse the plaintiff, up to the limits in
its tariff, who discovers that his property has been dam-
aged during loading or flight.
The situation in which the damage occurs during a cus-
toms inspection, however, is unlike the normal situation.
The question becomes when and how the airline is liable.
Presumably, the airline must have taken some action link-
ing itself to the cause of the damage. Thus, when the car-
rier delivers the property to the passenger and the
passenger then checks it through customs where it is dam-
aged, the airline will not be liable.
In Locks v. British Airways 230 the airline's actions sub-
jected it to liability even though the damage to the plain-
tiff's property occurred during the customs inspection.
Although the court did not address why the airline was
liable, the factual setting indicates the reason. Because
Locks's property arrived a day later than Locks, a British
Airways employee delivered the property to customs.
226 First Pa. Bank, 731 F.2d at 1122 (applying the increased value doctrine); see
also Rose & McAllister, supra note 222, at 666-67.
227 Neal v. Republic Airlines, 605 F. Supp. 1145, 1148 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
228 Id.
229 First Pa. Bank, 731 F.2d at 1116. Normally, the Warsaw Convention imposes
the same limit. See infra notes 233-40 and accompanying text.
2 0 759 F. Supp. 1137, 1141 (E.D. Pa. 1991). This is the companion case to
Locks v. Three Unidentified Customs Serv. Agents, 759 F. Supp. 1131 (E.D. Pa.
1990).
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Furthermore, the airline failed to notify Locks that his
sculpture had arrived, as they allegedly promised to do."'
The liability probably arose either because the airline had
possession of the property when it was delivered to cus-
toms or because it was negligent in failing to notify Locks
of the sculpture's arrival. Therefore, for the plaintiff to
recover from the airline, he must be able to prove some
action by the airline linking it to the damage. Apparently,
establishing this link can be very difficult.232
Since the plaintiff in a customs property damage suit
has flown on an international flight before the inspection,
the Warsaw Convention233 also governs her claim. 234  As
with the tariff, the Convention limits the carrier's liability
and, in turn, creates a presumption of the airline's liabil-
ity.23 ' The liability limit is determined according to the
23, Locks alleged that a British Airways employee told him the sculpture would
likely arrive the next day and that he would be notified so he could check it
through customs.
232 It is unlikely that the airline could be liable based solely on vicarious liability
principles. Two state courts have decided similar, but distinguishable, cases.
Both cases involved loss of baggage during pre- or post-flight security checks. In
Tremaroli v. Delta Airlines, 458 N.Y.S.2d 159, 161-62 (Civ. Ct. 1983), the court
held that since the airline required the security check and its agent performed it,
the airline had control of the passenger's property and was liable for its negligent
loss under a bailment theory. The court also held that despite the fact that the
F.A.A. required the security check, the airline still had a duty to safeguard the
baggage. Id. at 161.
In Wackenhut Corp. v. Lippert, 591 So. 2d 215, 218 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991),
the court found an airline liable for lost baggage during a security check. The
court reasoned that since the security company was the airline's agent, the airline
could be liable for its negligence. Id. The court also held that the airline's tariff
limitations did not apply. Id.
Since these cases involve negligence on the part of the airline's agents, they do
not apply to the case of damage done by customs officials who are not the airline's
agents.
233 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137
L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1988) [hereinafter Convention]. It
applies to all international transport of baggage by aircraft for hire. Id. art. 1, 1,
49 Stat. at 3013.
234 For a thorough discussion of airline baggage claims under the Warsaw Con-
vention, see Stephen C. Fulton, Airline Baggage Claims: A Tour Through the Legal
Minefield, 5 FLA. J. INT'L L. 349, 349-68 (1990).
25 Id. at 350 (citing Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243,
247 (1984)).
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weight of the lost or damaged property and the plaintiff
may recover $9.07 per pound.2 36
The Convention imposes liability for destruction, loss,
or damage to checked baggage when it occurs during
transport by air.237 The Convention defines transport by
air as the time in which the carrier is in charge of the bag-
gage. 238 This definition encompasses any custody the air-
line has of the property prior or subsequent to the time
the baggage is actually on the airplane.2 3 9 Therefore, to
recover, the plaintiff must establish delivery of property to
the airline in good condition, damage or loss of the prop-
erty during "transport," and the extent of the damage or
lOSS.24°
The plaintiff in a customs property damage case may
recover from the airline in limited situations, such as that
in Locks. Even in these situations, the plaintiff's monetary
recovery is limited. 24' The plaintiff may, however, avoid
the Convention's damage limitation if she can prove that
the airline or its agent acted with willful misconduct.242
In most cases, the plaintiff will not be able to show will-
ful misconduct. In one case, the plaintiff expressed his
concerns to an airline ticketing agent about a suspicious
Customs agent to whom he had turned over his baggage
prior to boarding.2 43 The plaintiff then asked the agent to
see his baggage, but the agent refused to get it. On reach-
236 Convention, supra note 233, art. 22, 49 Stat. at 3019. An exception to the
liability limit exists if the carrier or its employees acted with willful misconduct.
Id. art. 25, 49 Stat. at 3020.
237 Id. art. 18, 1, 49 Stat. at 3019.
238 Id. art. 18, 2, 49 Stat. at 3019.
239 Fulton, supra note 234, at 355 (citing Berman v. Trans World Airlines, 421
N.Y.S.2d 291 (Civ. Ct. 1979)). Thus, in Locks British Airways was liable since it
was in charge of the property when the damage occurred.
240 Fulton, supra note 234, at 366.
241 See Convention, supra note 233, art. 22, 49 Stat. at 3019 (imposing a limit of
$9.07 per pound); First Pa. Bank, N.A. v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 731 F.2d 1113,
1122 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that airlines may limit their liability if certain re-
quirements are met).
242 Convention, supra note 233, art. 25, 49 Stat. at 3020.
24, Rymanowski v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. 416 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (App. Div.
1979), aff'd 404 N.E.2d 1336 (N.Y. 1980).
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ing his destination, the plaintiff discovered his baggage
was lost. He alleged that the airline acted with willful mis-
conduct and that the employee and the Customs agent
colluded to steal his property. The court defined willful
misconduct as "a conscious intent to do or to omit doing
the act from which the harm results to another. 2 44
Although it appears from this definition that the agent's
action constituted willful misconduct, the court applied
paragraph 2 of Article 25 of the Convention and con-
cluded that no willful misconduct existed. 245 The court
held that this provision required the agent to be acting
within the scope of his employment and that collusion
with the customs agent to steal was not within the
scope. 46 Thus, even where it appears there is willful mis-
conduct, the exception may not apply.
In another case, an airline's agent refused to check the
plaintiff's baggage to see if it had been tagged.24 7 The
court held that the agent did not act with willful miscon-
duct.2 48 The court applied a similar test of "conscious in-
tent," adding that "[t]here must be a realization of the
probability of injury from the conduct, and a disregard of
the probable consequences of such conduct. ' 249  The
court found that the agent did not realize such actions
would result in probable injury and that he did not disre-
gard the consequences of those actions. 50
The above case seriously limits the situations in which
the passenger can prove willful misconduct. It is unlikely
that in the few situations where the airline is liable for
244 Id. at 1020 (quoting Goepp v. American Overseas Airlines, 117 N.Y.S.2d
276, 281 (App. Div. 1952), aff'd 114 N.E.2d 37 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 874
(1953)).
245 Id. Paragraph 2 of Article 25 says "the carrier shall not be entitled to avail
himself of the said provisions [of the Convention], if the damage is caused [by the
willful misconduct of) any agent of the carrier acting within the scope of his em-
ployment." Convention, supra note 233, art. 25, 2, 49 Stat. at 3020.
246 Rymanowski, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 1020.
247 Martin v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 135 (D.D.C. 1983).
248 Id. at 141-42.
249 Id. at 141 (quoting Grey v. American Airlines, Inc., 227 F.2d 282, 285 (2d
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 989 (1956)).
250 Id. at 142.
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damage done by customs agents, willful misconduct will
also be present. Therefore, recovery from the airline, if
available at all, will be largely inadequate in most cases
because of the liability limitation.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE
As demonstrated by the previous discussion, property
owners lack adequate judicial remedies when customs
agents damage their property during inspection or deten-
tion. Despite the importance of the Customs Service's
function, some form of adequate remedy should be avail-
able to the innocent property owner. Furthermore, the
present state of the law in this area does not meet the
goals of our tort system. Although compensation is the
primary goal of the law of torts, plaintiffs are inadequately
compensated for their loss. 25 1 When negligent customs
officials damage an innocent airline passenger's baggage,
the passenger deserves just compensation according to
our tort system. In most cases, the passenger will not be
compensated unless she recovers via an administrative
claim.252 In addition, the present law in this area does not
satisfy another important goal of torts - deterrence and
prevention of future harm.253 The federal government
has no incentive to prevent Customs Service employees
from damaging citizens' property because the govern-
ment is immune from suit in those cases.2 54 Furthermore,
due to the difficulty of succeeding on a claim against indi-
vidual agents, customs agents need not attempt to inspect
property carefully.255
To remedy the lack of compensation and deterrence in
this area, one or two changes need to be made. First, the
Supreme Court should overturn its decision in Kosak v.
2.1 W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at
5 (5th ed. 1984).
252 See supra note 6.
253 KEETON, supra note 251, § 4, at 25.
2" See supra notes 7-23 and accompanying text.
255 See supra part III.
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United States.256 The majority's rationale in this case is
open to criticism, 257 and Justice Stevens's dissent 258 is the
better reasoning in the case.
Justice Stevens first rejected the Court's finding that the
ordinary meaning of the provision's words "arising in re-
spect of ' 259 was really "arising out of," and therefore ap-
plied to damage occurring during detention. 6 ° Justice
Stevens instead thought that the normal reading of those
words was what the language said, not "arising out of."'2 6 1
"Arising in respect of," according to Justice Stevens, ap-
plies only to damages resulting from the temporary inter-
ference with the property owner's possession rather than
physical damage to the goods during detention.262
Clearly, as a matter of common sense, the ordinary read-
ing of "arising in respect of" is "arising in respect of,"
not "arising out of." Justice Stevens' reading of the
words, therefore, is the more obvious reading, and it ap-
pears that the two phrases have two distinct meanings.
Justice Stevens offered further proof that the majority
erred on the issue of the phrase's meaning. He analyzed
the other exceptions found in 28 U.S.C. § 2680 and ar-
gued that since Congress used the "arising out of" lan-
guage in some of the other subsections,263 and since there
was no persuasive evidence to the contrary, the Court
should assume that Congress intended to express a differ-
ent meaning in section 2680(c) than in the others subsec-
256 465 U.S. 848 (1984). The Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) barred claims
against the Customs Service for damages caused by or occurring during detention
to someone's property. Kosak, 465 U.S. at 855.
257 See supra notes 10-23 and accompanying text. The Court cited the plain
meaning of the words, the legislative history of the statute, and the objectives of
the exceptions to 28 U.S.C. § 2680 as supporting its interpretation of subsection
(c). Kosak, 465 U.S. at 854-61.
25 Kosak, 465 U.S. at 862-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
259 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (1988) states that there is no cause of action for "[any
claim arising in respect of ... the detention of any goods or merchandise by any
office of customs." Id. (emphasis added).
2- Kosak, 465 U.S. at 862, 863.
261 Id. at 862.
262 Id.
263 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b), (e), (h) (1988).
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tions. 64 This argument is very persuasive. If Congress
intended the words "arising in respect of" to mean "aris-
ing out of" as the majority held, why did Congress not
use those words in subsection (c) as it did in the other
subsections ?265
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals made a similar ar-
gument in deciding this issue in a case prior to Kosak.266
In holding that section 2680(c) should be read narrowly,
the court compared subsection (c) to subsection (b) of
section 2680. Subsection (b) excepts actions "arising out
of the loss, miscarriage or negligent transmission" of the
mail.267 The court reasoned that if Congress had in-
tended to make the government immune for negligent
handling of property by customs agents, it would have in-
cluded the Customs Service in subsection (b), or at least
worded subsection (c) similarly.268 The court found
"[t]he conclusion.., inescapable that [Congress] did not
choose to bestow upon all such agencies general absolu-
tion from carelessness in handling property belonging to
others. ' 269
Justice Stevens next argued that the statute's legislative
history did not support the majority's interpretation.270
The majority had found strong support for its reading in a
report by an apparent draftsman. 7 1 Justice Stevens, how-
ever, dismissed the report as worthless since it was an in-
ternal Justice Department working paper that was never
264 Kosak, 465 U.S. at 863. As seen by the following discussion, Justice Stevens
did not find any pervasive evidence to the contrary.
265 At least one commentator has made this same argument, stating that the use
of different language suggests that § 2680(c) does not apply to damage arising out
of the detention. Case Comment, supra note 7, at 1054.
266 A-Mark, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv. Dep't of the Treasury, 593 F.2d
849, 850 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
267 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b) (1988).
268 A-Mark, 593 F.2d at 850.
269 Id. (quoting Alliance Assurance Co. v. United States, 252 F.2d 529, 534 (2d
Cir. 1958)).
270 Id. at 863-65.
271 Id. at 856-57.
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mentioned in the statute's legislative history. 72 He ar-
gued that the Court should not attribute the intent of a
lobbyist to Congress without any evidence that Congress
shared that intent.273
Furthermore, Justice Stevens found the House Commit-
tee Report that the majority cited2 74 unhelpful in deter-
mining Congress's intent because of the way the words
"arising out of" were used in the Report. 275 The Report,
according to Justice Stevens, contained the words in an
introduction to a list of exceptions and used them in the
interest of brevity, not precision. 76 Considering the leg-
islative history in the lightJustice Stevens presented it, the
majority's reliance on it appears misplaced.
Finally, Justice Stevens argued that the Court's analysis
of the purposes of the exceptions found throughout the
legislative history carried no weight. 277 He thought that
such a discussion only explained generally why Congress
may have decided to create exceptions to the statute's
waiver of sovereign immunity. 7 8 According to Justice
Stevens, such a general discussion was no more persua-
sive than an argument based on the general reasons for
waiving the immunity in the first place.279 Specifically,
Justice Stevens addressed each purpose the majority
cited.
The Court reasoned that the denial of any claim for
272 Id. at 863. Justice Stevens said there is no evidence that Congress even knew
of the report's existence. Id.
273 Id. One commentator, in a review of the Supreme Court's use of non-legis-
lators' contributions to legislative history, argued that the Kosak Court should not
have relied on the report at all since it was not in the Congressional Record. Al-
lison C. Giles, Note, The Value of Nonlegislators' Contributions to Legislative History, 79
GEO. L.J. 359, 383 (1990).
274 Kosak, 465 U.S. at 857 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 6
(1945)).




279 Id. Even if it were a valuable analysis, Justice Stevens found the general
basis of the exceptions less persuasive than the overwhelming purpose of the stat-
ute. Id. at 868.
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damages relating to a customs detention protected an im-
portant government activity from the disruption of law-
suits. 2 0 Justice Stevens responded to this by saying that
the majority's reasoning was not persuasive since, shortly
thereafter, the Court identified two alternative remedies
available to plaintiffs.28 ' By citing the need to protect the
Customs Service from disruptive suits and then identify-
ing two alternate remedies, the Court seems to belittle
this goal. Furthermore, it is questionable that an FTCA
suit would disrupt the Custom Service's activities as the
Court said. More likely, the availability of an alternative
claim against the individual customs agent would disrupt
the agent's effectiveness in performing her duties, yet the
majority expressed no concern over these suits. 2 2
Another argument against the majority's reasoning on
this point is that allowing suits against the government for
the Custom Service's, or its officials', negligence does not
undermine the Service's effectiveness any more than do
suits that are allowed under the FTCA for other federal
agencies' negligence. 8 5 Allowing suits for detention, on
the other hand, potentially undermines the Customs Ser-
vice's effectiveness because it threatens the agents' discre-
tion in determining when to detain goods.28 4 Allowing
suits for customs agents' negligence would only be dis-
ruptive in the sense that it would make negligent agents
alter the incorrect methods of inspection they employ,
which is obviously not the type of disruption concerning
the Court. Therefore, based on these arguments, it ap-
280 Id. at 859.
281 Id. at 866; see also Weiss, supra note 6, at 144 (arguing that the availability of
other remedies works against the Court's reasoning here). The majority identi-
fied the common-law tort claim against the customs agent and an implied bail-
ment claim against the government as possible remedies. Kosak, 465 U.S. at 860,
861 n.22.
212 Justice Stevens also thought that the availability of a claim against the agent
was more "dampening" to the Customs Service's effectiveness than a suit against
the federal government. Kosak, 465 U.S. at 866.
282 Case Comment, supra note 7, at 1059.
284 Id.
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pears that Justice Stevens's reading of the statute fits logi-
cally with the first general purpose of the exceptions.
The second objective of the exceptions to the FTCA,
which the majority found satisfied by their holding, is
preventing fraudulent claims. 85 The Court found this
objective especially important to section 2680(c) because
of the Customs Service's inability to screen fraudulent
claims due to the limited funds available for careful in-
spection of the condition of incoming goods.286 Justice
Stevens responded to this finding by saying: "[O]ne won-
ders what the staff which detain the items are doing with
them if not inspecting them, why they cannot make a rec-
ord of the condition of the goods, [and] why this burden
would be onerous .... 1287 Furthermore, he noted that
customs agents make such inspections of condition to
some extent already. 288 Therefore, the lack of funds com-
plained of by the majority in reality is of little concern.
Although the general concern of fraudulent claims ap-
pears legitimate, the majority's reliance on it is misplaced.
The problem of preventing fraudulent claims is no more
difficult in the customs context than for any other govern-
ment function. Furthermore, the Court's identification of
alternative claims available in these situations,28 9 which
are just as likely to be fraudulent, shows that in reality
avoiding fraudulent claims is not an important objective
of this exception. 9 °
Finally, the majority found that its interpretation ful-
filled the third general objective of the FTCA exceptions,
that is, not waiving sovereign immunity for claims where
existing remedies were adequate. The majority found this
third objective met because of the availability of the tort
claim and the implied bailment claim.29 ' Justice Stevens
285 Kosak, 465 U.S. at 858.
286 Id. at 859.
287 Id. at 865 n.3.
288 Id. (citing U.S. CUSTOMS INSPECTOR'S HANDBOOK §§ 3.54(b), 5.72 (1982)).
2119 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
2110 See Weiss, supra note 6, at 144.
211, Kosak, 465 U.S. at 800.
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argued that reliance on this finding "simply beg[ged] the
question.1 292  He found no evidence that Congress
thought the remedies for these types of claims were ade-
quate. 93 Therefore, Justice Stevens thought the basic ob-
jective of the FTCA, to remedy the inadequacies of
existing remedies, trumped this third objective of the
exceptions .294
After analyzing both opinions, Justice Stevens's reason-
ing appears to be the most persuasive. According to the
plain language of the statute, the statute's legislative his-
tory, and the general purposes of the FTCA and its excep-
tions, section 2680(c) should only apply to claims against
the federal government for damages arising from the fact
of the detention itself. This construction of the statute is
also more consistent with the objectives of our tort sys-
tem. It allows for the adequate compensation of the inno-
cent plaintiff when harmed by the government's
negligence. Furthermore, this construction provides in-
centive for the Customs Service to take care in inspecting
and detaining citizens' property.
The other change that would improve plaintiffs' com-
pensation and provide better deterrence of negligent
292 Id. at 866.
23 Id. There is evidence, however, that section 2680(c) was included in the
statute precisely because of the availability of adequate alternative remedies. Case
Comment, supra note 7, at 1057 (citing Irvin M. Gottlieb, The Federal Tort Claims Act
- A Statutory Interpretation, 35 GEO. L.J. 1, 45 (1946)). These pre-existing reme-
dies, however, were available only for claims based on the detention itself, not for
damage to property during the detention. Id. Therefore, Justice Stevens proba-
bly was referring to the property damage claim when he said there was no evi-
dence that Congress considered the existing remedies adequate. See Kosak v.
United States, 465 U.S. 848, 866 (1984). This evidence also supports Justice Ste-
vens's interpretation of the statute. If remedies were only adequate for damages
from the detention itself, then the purpose of section 2680(c) would likely be to
exclude those claims from the FTCA, but not claims for property damage during
the detention.
294 Kosak, 465 U.S. at 866. Whatever the merits of the Court's and Justice Ste-
vens's findings on this point, it appears from this Comment's analysis of the two
supposed alternate remedies, as well as any other alternatives, that such remedies
are no longer adequate. Thus, the argument that section 2680(c) covers all claims
involving a customs detention because of existing adequate remedies carries no
weight.
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property handling is overruling the Supreme Court's de-
cision in United States v. Smith, 95 or amending the Liability
Reform Act to abrogate that decision. The Court held in
Smith that the Liability Reform Act's sole remedy provi-
sion 296 requires the substitution of the United States as
the defendant in suits against government officials acting
within the scope of their employment, even if the plaintiff
has no remedy against the United States due to an excep-
tion to the FTCA.297 Although it identified a split among
the circuit courts on the issue, the Court supported its de-
cision by analyzing the statute's language and legislative
history.298
By reaching this decision, the Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in the case.299 The cir-
cuit court had held the Liability Reform Act inapplicable
to the case because Smith would have had no remedy
against the United States under the FTCA.3 0 0 The circuit
court decided that Congress did not intend the Liability
Reform Act to extend to claims covered by the exceptions
found in section 2680 of the FTCA.30  To support this
decision, the court discussed the Act's treatment of Ten-
nessee Valley Authority (TVA) officials. Although section
2680(1) exempts the United States from liability for the
conduct of these officials, the Liability Reform Act ex-
pressly provides coverage for TVA employees. ° The
court found that "[tihe fact that Congress felt it necessary
to specifically mention TVA employees in [the Liability
Reform Act] strongly suggests that Congress believed that
29- 499 U.S. 160 (1991). See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Smith.
296 See supra note 80.
297 Smith, 499 U.S. at 162.
298 Id. at 165-67.
2-9 See Smith v. Marshall, 885 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1989).
5- Id. at 654-55. Smith's suit involved a claim of malpractice against a military
physician arising from an incident occurring at an overseas military base. Smith's
suit, once the United States was substituted as the defendant, was barred by 28
U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1988), which bars suits based on conduct occurring in foreign
territory.
-01 Id. at 655.
302 Id.; see 16 U.S.C. § 831c-2(b)(1) (Supp. 1993).
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absent [this] specific language.., those employees would
remain without immunity.1 30 3 In other words, the court
assumed that since the government was not liable for
claims based on TVA action, TVA officials would remain
liable despite the Liability Reform Act unless they were
specifically covered by it.
Although the circuit court's reasoning seems logical,
the Supreme Court rejected this analysis, finding that the
purpose of the Act's reference to TVA employees was to
indicate that a suit against them would proceed against
the TVA, not the United States, as in the usual case. °4
The Court thought this provision had nothing to do with
the exception found in section 2680(1), but instead
thought Congress included it only to clarify who would be
substituted in such a suit.30 5 This analysis is quite persua-
sive, and it casts serious doubt on the correctness of the
lower court's reasoning.
The circuit court, unlike the Supreme Court,30 6 found
the legislative history of the Liability Reform Act contra-
dictory on the issue.30 7 The circuit court and Justice Ste-
vens30 opined that one of the primary themes of the Act,
found in the legislative history, supported its construction
of the statute.3 0 9 This theme is that "no one who previ-
ously had the right to initiate a lawsuit will lose that
right. ' 310 Although this clearly supports the appellate
court's holding, the Supreme Court characterized the re-
port's language as an indication that the Liability Reform
Act would preserve the procedural right to sue, not the
303 Smith, 885 F.2d at 655.
304 Smith, 499 U.S. at 169. Apparently, the TVA itself is liable in tort apart from
the FTCA. Id.
305 Id.
306 Justice Stevens dissented from the majority's opinion finding, in part, that
the legislative history supported the contrary decision. Id. at 178-81.
307 Smith, 885 F.2d at 655.
3os Smith, 499 U.S. at 178-81.
3- Smith, 885 F.2d at 655.
310 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 100-700, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7, reprinted in
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5945, 5950-57).
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substantive right.3 1  The Court found that other language
in the report was more dispositive of the issue. 312 This
language said that "any claim against the government that
is precluded by the exceptions set forth in Section 2680 of
Title 28, U.S.C. also is precluded against an employee
"$313
The circuit court also cited this passage saying that,
combined with the other quoted portion of the report,
this showed the legislative history was contradictory. 1 4
The language used by the Supreme Court, however, ap-
pears unambiguous and strongly supportive of its hold-
ing. Nevertheless, the circuit court found the two
passages unreconcilable, making the report "internally in-
consistent. 3' 5 The circuit court concluded that since the
legislative history was inconsistent, "but the statutory lan-
guage is not," the Liability Reform Act did not apply. 1 6
As seen by the court of appeals' and Justice Stevens's
analysis, it is clear that the Liability Reform Act is legiti-
mately susceptible to the construction that it does not ap-
ply when section 2680 of the FTCA bars the substituted
claim against the government. The Supreme Court's
analysis, however, is equally persuasive and should proba-
bly stand, in which case, the legislature should step in and
abrogate the Supreme Court's decision. Congress should
do this for several reasons. First, with the prevailing con-
struction of section 2680(c) of the FTCA, the immunity of
individual customs agents for common law tort claims
under the Liability Reform Act and Smith almost assures
the plaintiff no remedy for customs agents' negligence.
This prevents the fulfillment of the primary goal of our
31 Smith, 499 U.S. at 166 n.9.
312 Id.
313 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 100-700, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7, reprinted in
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5945, 5950-51).
"1 Smith, 885 F.2d at 655.
315 Id. at 656.
316 Id.
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tort system, that of victim compensation.31 7
Furthermore, the Liability Reform Act does not accom-
plish another important goal of torts: deterrence. The
best way to deter customs agents from negligently han-
dling a person's property is to hold them personally liable
for the damage they cause. Although such liability may
harm or disrupt the effectiveness of the customs agents'
performance of their duties, this must be balanced with
the right and importance of compensation of innocent
property owners and the need to prevent future harm. If
the person were able to recover from the government, the
harmful effects of holding agents personally liable may
outweigh the need for deterrence. Until that is possible,
however, the combination of the need for compensation
and deterrence is too strong to merit concern for the dis-
ruption of the agents' effectiveness.
Finally, the prevailing construction of the Liability Re-
form Act does not satisfy the primary purpose of the Act
itself. This purpose is to protect federal employees and at
the same time benefit the plaintiffs by giving them a better
source of recovery in the federal government. 8 Plaintiffs
whose property customs agents damage, however, are se-
verely harmed by the Liability Reform Act. Therefore,
the balance intended by the legislature is unattainable as
it applies to customs officials. The question, therefore, is
which is more important, the compensation of innocent
victims or the protection of federal employees from suit.
Although both objectives are extremely important, courts
should not place the interests of the wrongdoer above
those of the innocent. The property owner should receive
compensation.
VI. CONCLUSION
The importance of the Customs Service in protecting
our borders from the influx of narcotics is unquestioned.
3,7 See supra notes 253-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of the pur-
poses of tort law.
318 Smith, 499 U.S. at 181 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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In carrying out their important duties, customs agents
may severely damage the property of innocent airline pas-
sengers and shippers. This was Gene Locks's experience.
In most cases, judicial remedies for such damage are
highly inadequate. Through its decision in Kosak, the
Supreme Court for all practical purposes foreclosed a
remedy under the FTCA for these plaintiffs by reading an
exception to the FTCA broadly. The exception now bars
any claims arising out of a customs detention. It also ap-
pears that, because of the broad reading given the excep-
tion by the Kosak Court and others, the exception bars
claims arising out of simple inspections. Therefore, re-
covery under the FTCA is limited to plaintiffs who can
avoid this barrier through creative pleading. Further-
more, claims against the government under the Tucker
Act are rarely available to plaintiffs in this situation, leav-
ing recovery against the government essentially
nonexistent.
Claims against individual customs agents also provide
inadequate recovery. The Liability Reform Act bars any
common law tort claim against agents acting within the
scope of their employment. This likely covers most cases.
Constitutional claims against agents based on the Fourth
or Fifth Amendments offer more hope than common law
tort claims, but they too are seriously limited. Fourth
Amendment claims almost certainly fail because of the
broad policy that all border searches are reasonable. Fifth
Amendment substantive due process claims are limited
because they require plaintiffs to show the agent acted
with more than negligence. Even if plaintiffs can satisfy
these burdens, customs agents have qualified immunity,
which may protect them.
Having no remedy against the government or individ-
ual customs agents, plaintiffs may attempt to recover
against the airlines as Gene Locks did. Most likely, recov-
ery on this claim will occur only in the highly unusual
cases in which the airline has some connection to the cus-
toms agents' actions. If the connection exists, the Warsaw
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Convention limits the airline's liability in most cases.
Even though the Convention limits their liability, airlines
should not be responsible for compensating plaintiffs in
these cases. Therefore, this Comment recommends two
changes in the law to make the government and customs
agents responsible. These changes involve overturning
the Kosak decision and amending the Liability Reform Act
to abrogate the Smith decision. This would allow for full
compensation of innocent property owners and deter-
rence of negligence by customs agents. With these
changes in place, the next Gene Locks can recover the
$21,000 his sculpture is worth, not the $90.70 actually
recovered.
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